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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
SANDRA SHEIKH,

I
Petitioner,

STATE OF UTAH/UTAH DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC SAFETY,

1

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

i

Case No. 940563-CA

i

Priority 14

Respondent.
STATEMENT OP JURISDICTION
This appeal is from a final judgment
Commission of the State of Utah.

of the Industrial

Jurisdiction is conferred upon

this court under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-6 (1993) and Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (a) (Supp. 1994).
NATURE OP THE PROCEEDINGS
A formal evidentiary hearing was held tinder Utah Code Ann. §
34-35-7.1 (1993) and Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-8 (1993) before an
Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) of the Utah Industrial Commission
(Commission).

His decision was appealed to the Commission.

The

Commission issued a final agency order on August 25, 1994, denying
Petitioner's Motion for Review and sustaining the ALJ's decision.
Petitioner Sandra Sheikh (Sheikh) filed her Petition for Review of
the Commission's Order on September 23, 1994.
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

1.

Did the Commission correctly conclude Petitioner Sheikh

did not establish a prima facie case of discrimination against her
by the Department of Public Safety because of her pregnancy?

In

any event, is this issue irrelevant where the factfinder found,
based on all the evidence presented by both parties, that no such
illegal discrimination had occurred?
Whether or not a prima facie case has been made out is a
question of law, £££ Call v. Citv of West Jordan. 727 P.2d 180, 182
(Utah 1986), which is reviewed for correctness, Zissi v. Tax
Comm'n. 842 P.2d 848, 852-3 & n. 2 (Utah 1992).

However, this

issue is rendered irrelevant where the employer attempts to rebut
an employee's accusation of unlawful discrimination; instead, the
focus shifts to the factfinder's ultimate determination of whether
the complainant has proved that prohibited discrimination occurred.
United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens. 460 U.S.
711, 715-16 (1983) (cited in State v. Harrison. 805 P.2d 769, 777
(Utah App. 1991)); £££ generally University of Utah v. Industrial
Comm'n. 736 P.2d 630 (Utah 1987) (Discussing shifting burden of
production of evidence--not ultimate burden of proof--under Utah
Anti-Discrimination Act).
2.

Should the Court accept, as supported by substantial

evidence, the Commission's findings and conclusion that no such
discrimination

occurred

in light

of

Petitioner's

failure

marshall the record evidence supporting those findings?

2

to

One who challenges an agency's factual findings under Utah
Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g) (1993) must marshall all the evidence
supporting those findings and then show that despite that evidence
and the reasonable inferences therefrom, the findings are not
supported by substantial evidence on the whole record.

Kennecott

Corp. v. State Tax Common. 858 P.2d 1381, 1385 (Utah 1993); T W ^ r s
Ltd. Inc. v. Department Enrol. S e c . 863 P,2d 12, 18 (Utah App.
1993), cert, denied. 878 P.2d 1154 (Utah 1994) . If the marshalling
burden is not met, the reviewing court accepts the challenged
findings-

E.g.. Johnson v. Board of Review. 842 P.2d 910, 912

(Utah App. 1992).
3.

Is there substantial evidence to support the Commission's

findings and conclusion that the Department of Public Safety did
not discriminate against Sheikh because of her pregnancy in setting
the dispatchers' work schedule for the three weeks after her return
from maternity leave?
Substantial evidence is "that quantum and quality of relevant
evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support
a conclusion-" First Nat'l Bank v. County Bd. of Equalization. 799
P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990); acgprfl Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of
Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 1989).

A reviewing court does

not redetermine credibility or reweigh the record evidence, Ouestar
Pipeline Co. v. State Tax Comm'n. 850 P.2d 1175, 1178 (Utah 1993),
or substitute its judgment as between two reasonably conflicting
inferences that could be drawn from the record evidence,
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Albertsong. Inc. v. Department Empi. Sec. 854 P.2d 570# 575 (Utah
App. 1993).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
The following statutes are applicable in this matter.

The

text of the provisions either appears in argument or in the
Addendum to this brief.

STATUTES ?
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-6(1) (a) (i)

2.

Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1

(1993)

(1993)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner Sheikh was a dispatcher for the Department of
Public Safety in the Price dispatch center.

She became pregnant

and took maternity leave from her position. After one week back at
work, Petitioner resigned.

Her schedule had been modified to

account for the training of a new employee.

She did not complain

to management of the modified schedule and had not asked for
modifications to her schedule before her resignation on May 10,
1990.
On August

14# 1990, three months after her resignation,

Petitioner filed a charge of discrimination (R.l# Addendum H) based
on pregnancy. An evidentiary hearing was held before an ALJ of the
Commission who found that the actions of the Department were not
discriminatory and denied Petitioner's claim (Addendum A ) .
Petitioner appealed to the full Commission to review the ALJ's
findings and conclusions. The Commission adopted the findings and
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conclusions of the ALJ and sustained his decision (Addendum B) .
From that decision, Petitioner appeals to this court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This appeal consists of a challenge to the ALJ's findings and
the conclusions drawn therefrom.

As such, the starting place for

reciting the facts are those as stated by the ALJ in his decision.
Respondent does not deem it necessary to recite each of the
findings so found and refers the Court to Addendum A which contains
the decision of the ALJ.

Point III of this brief contains a

detailed recitation of evidence supporting the findings of the ALJ
and therefore specific Record citations will not be contained in
the following factual summary. The following is a narrative of the
findings of Addendum A to help the Court understand the background
for this appeal.
Sheikh had been a dispatcher in the Price dispatch center for
10 and 1/2 years prior to her resignation from the Department of
Public Safety in May 1990.

For the last two years of her

employment, she had been an employee of the State Department of
Public Safety after a consolidation with the county center.
On October 26, 1989, Sheikh received a copy of the center's
Information and requirement sheet. She read it, signed it and
understood its contents.

That sheet (Exhibit R-4, Addendum C)

contained both positive and negative expressions of the position
and explained what was required of dispatchers. " Included among the
things required were the necessity of working various schedules,
being unable to choose days off, shifts worked, having to be
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available at all times, being required to obtain child care at one
hour's notice any time of day or night and having to work through
breaks.

These factors created much stress and caused difficulty

with one's personal and social life.
The Price Center was understaffed and had little flexibility
in the number of dispatchers that could be used.

Temporary

employees (AJs) could be used if necessary but only after permanent
employees could not fill the necessary shifts.

There was no

separate budget for AJs and therefore the use of AJs was limited.
At one point of time after consolidation, the schedule was
straight shifts which went by seniority and gave }ess senior
employees the least desirable shifts.

The straight schedule was

changed to a two week rotating schedule.

The two week rotational

schedule gave little time for employees to adjust and created what
was called "double back" or "short change" which was working a
second shift with only 8 or 9 hours between shifts.
After employees complained about the two week rotational
schedule, one dispatcher,

John Kelly, prepared

a three week

rotational schedule and presented his proposal to dispatch center
director Nancy Hansen for consideration.

After discussion with

center

it

dispatchers,

including

Sheikh,

was

adopted

and

implemented effective March 3, 1990 (Exhibit P-5, Addendum D ) .
Before Sheikh went on maternity leave, Hansen met with Sheikh
and went over the proposed schedule that Sheikh would be returning
to when she came back from maternity leave as projected by the
newly adopted three week rotational schedule. Sheikh had seen the
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particular rotational for the three three-week period for her
actual return (Exhibit R-l# Addendum E) . This rotational schedule
was in effect at the time Sheikh returned from maternity leave.
The rotational shifts as planned were for basic shifts.
Actual shifts worked would vary because of time off people would
need for vacation, sickness or personal emergencies. If such took
place, adjustments needed to be made to cover shifts not covered by
the absent employees.
While Sheikh was on maternity leave, Patti, one of the
permanent employees, resigned.

A new employee, Russele was J^ired

in mid April to take Patti's position.

Russele was assigned to

take over Patti#s schedule since all other permanent employees
already had their assigned schedule under the three week rotational
schedule•
It was department policy that a new employee or someone who
was in training could not be on a graveyard shift alone.

As a

result, Russele could not work any graveyard shifts during her
training period.
When Sheikh returned from maternity leave, Russele was working
Patti's previously assigned shifts. Exhibit R-l, Addendum E, had
Russele scheduled for graveyard shifts for Saturdays and Sundays
for the rotation of 5-5-90 through 5-25-90. As such, Russele could
not work these graveyard shifts because she had only been in
training for a few weeks.
Center

policy

dictated

that

the person

who worked

the

afternoon shift on the day the graveyard shift could not be
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handled, would shift down to the graveyard shift.

This was a

common practice and all employees had been required to do so.
Sheikh's schedule fcr the Saturdays and Sundays Russele was
scheduled to work graveyards for the rotational of 5-5-90 to 5-2590 was afternoon shift.

Pursuant to center policy Sheikh's

schedule was modified to work the graveyard shifts for the days
Russele could not.
By shifting Sheikh to the graveyard shifts for the Saturdays
and Sundays, a "double back" or "short change,f was created when
Sheikh was regularly scheduled to work an afternoon shift on the
Monday following the two graveyard shifts. Though this would have
only gone on for the three weeks of that rotation, Sheikh's
supervisor Lisa Shook (Shook) was concerned regarding the double
back and called Sheikh a few days before Sheikh's scheduled return.
When Sheikh was told about

the schedule

change, Sheikh

expressed no concern about the graveyard shifts and inquired about
the double back. When Shook offered to allow Sheikh to work three
graveyard shifts instead of having to work the double back, Sheikh
declined and said she would work it.

Sheikh knew Shook had the

authority to change schedules but never asked her to do so.
use of AJs was not

considered by management

The

because Sheikh

expressed no concern about working the schedule.
While the Department acknowledged that the schedule was a
tough one, Sheikh never complained about her schedule, never
mentioned anxiety, pressure or difficulty and did not ask anyone to
change the schedule prior to her resignation. Employees testified
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that it was not unreasonable or that they would have worked it if
required.
After Sheikh had been back at work a few days, she met with
Hansen and submitted a letter of resignation (Exhibit R-2, Addendum
F).

The letter of resignation listed an inability to obtain baby

sitters as the reason for resigningother reason.

No mention was made of any

Hansen suggested that Sheikh could ask other

dispatchers to trade shifts with her and that no pre-authorization
was needed.

Instead of doing so, Sheikh did not ask for more time

off but simply asked if she could have a straight shift which no
one else (other than managers) had or if she could do a part time
job share. Neither of these options were available at the center.
Sheikh never worked any of the double backs but called in sick
on the Monday following the graveyard shifts or for the graveyard
shifts.

The actual schedule worked as recorded

(Exhibit P-l,

Addendum G) shows she worked less than scheduled for each of the
three weeks before her resignation was effective.
After her resignation, Shook and Hansen figured Sheikh would
call in sick for the graveyards since it was known she did not like
graveyard shifts and had called in sick for graveyard shifts
previously. Sheikh did call in sick as expected, but Shook did not
confront or take adverse action against Sheikh.

Sheikh's failure

to appear required John Kelly to modify his schedule and cancel a
day off.
Had Sheikh complained about the schedule either before or
after her return, something could have been done, but Sheikh never
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complained and did not ask for her schedule to be changed. Sheikh
had complained regularly that if she did not like a particular
schedule she would quit and made the comment to John Kelly after
her return and before her resignation.

Her resignation was no

surprise to dispatch center employees.
The three week rotating schedule continued at least through
March of 1991, some ten months after Sheikh resigned. The schedule
rotated every three weeks.

Two days after Sheikh quit, the

schedule rotated to the next assigned schedule.

Had Sheikh

remained with the center, she would have eventually worked each of
the various rotations.
Sheikh knew the schedule rotated every three weeks.
part of the decision making process to implement it.
was normal for the schedule to shift down one line.

She was

She knew it
The typed

schedule was placed in a notebook for dispatchers to examine.
Sheikh acknowledged going over the rotational schedule with Hansen
and that she looked in the notebook upon her return from maternity
leave.

Other than the two graveyard shifts Sheikh was assigned

because of the training of Russele, the schedule she returned to
was the same schedule she had been shown in March before she went
on maternity leave.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The ALJ ruled that based on the totality of facts, Petitioner
failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on
her pregnancy.

Absent a showing that the ALJ erred in this

conclusion, it is not necessary to address the issue of shifting
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burdens.

The burden does not shift if a party fails to meet the

initial prima facie burden in presenting the case.
A party claiming that there is insufficient evidence to
sustain a decision of an ALJ must first marshall all the evidence
favoring the ALJ's decision and then show how and why that evidence
is insufficient to sustain the decision and inferences drawn from
the evidence.

Petitioner has not done so in this case.

She has

argued as an advocate presenting evidence sufficient only to argue
support for her theory of the case.

This court should reject her

approach because she has not presented the facts found by the ALJ
and

the evidence

and testimony

that

is supportive

of those

findings. She simply focused on what she believes is in the record
that supports her interpretation of the case.
If this Court determines that the ALJ was either wrong in his
ruling on Petitioner's failure to establish a prima facie case or
that Petitioner has not failed to appropriately marshall evidence#
there is nonetheless substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's
decision.

This appeal is not for the purpose of determining if

substantial evidence exists to support

Petitioner's claim of

discrimination, but is to determine whether there is substantial
evidence to support the findings of the ALJ.

PPPTT I
PETITIONER FAILED TO ADDRESS THE
ALJ'S DETERMINATION THAT SHE HAD
FAILED TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE
CASE
At the conclusion of trial, the Administrative Law Judge wrote
11

at page 7 of his decision (R.49):
During the evidentiary hearing it was
determined that the Charging Party had barely
managed to make a prima facie case.
Upon
retrospect,
and
considering
the
total
evidence, it is apparent; that the balance must
shift in favor of determining that the
employee failed to make a prima facie case in
this matter . . .
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the charging
Party, Sandra Sheikh, has failed to establish
a prima
facie case in the claim of
discrimination by her employer...(Emphasis in
original).
The initial issue is set by the Administrative Law Judge and
the Commission in its Order adopting the Findings and Conclusions
of the ALJ (R. 152-4, Addendum A ) . Petitioner never met her prima
facie test.

Therefore, the Petitioner's claim that the ALJ and

Commission erred in not appropriately applying discrimination and
constructive discharge burdens is misplaced and not relevant.
In Love v. RE/MAX OF AM,. 738 F.2d 383, 385 (10th Cir. 1984),
a Title VII case, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a
charging party, in order to establish a prima facie case of
employment discrimination, must show that she (1) engaged in a
protected activity, (2) was subjected by the employer to adverse
employment action and (3) a causal link existed between the two.
The Industrial Commission follows and incorporates federal
case law as authority because of the joint nature and similarity
between

State and Federal

law.

The burdens

and

tests for

discrimination are applied for both State and Federal claims.
Petitioner's initial claim was filed under both the Utah AntiDiscrimination Statute as well as Title VII of the Federal Code.
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The case numbers for both the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division and
the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission are noted on the

original Charge of Discrimination (R.l, Addendum H) as well as the
final Order from the ALJ (R.43A, Addendum A) • The state filing is
based on Utah Code Ann, § 34-35-6 (1) (a) (i) .

This provision

requires a showing that action taken against or toward an employee
must be "because of,..pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related
conditions.. .n (emphasis added) . The Federal filing is based on 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) which prohibits discrimination on the basis
of sex. Under both statutory provisions, Petitioner has failed to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on sex or
pregnancy.
Respondent disagrees with Petitioner that there is a shifting
burden of proof, regardless of how the Court views Petitioner's
first argument.

In Te*ag IteP't Qf CPTnmynity A f W r g v, gvnrflipe,

450 U.S. 248 (1981), the United States Supreme Court held that the
ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant
intentionally discriminated against a petitioner remains at all
times with the Petitioner.

It does not shift to the Respondent.

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817
(1973), cited by Petitioner, holds that to meet the prima facie
requirement a Petitioner has to present sufficient evidence to
establish a rebuttable presumption that actions taken were the
result of ("because of") discriminatory intent.

It is not enough

to meet the first two prongs of the Love test as set forth above.
Petitioner also has to establish through credible evidence that
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there is a causal connection between the two prongs and what could
be inferred as discrimination.
The Supreme Court in Burdine stated that all the employer
needed to show to overcome a prima facie case was a legitimate
reason for the action which could mean nothing more than the action
being non-discriminatory. A mere inference alone, however, is not
enough to meet the prima facie test, for a fact finder can
ultimately decide that the facts supporting the inference is not
sufficient

to meet

Petitioner's burden and rule against the

charging party even if a defendant presents no evidence.
As correctly held by the ALJ, the determination of whether a
party has met the prima facie test is determined by weighing the
overall evidence presented. fi£g: EgtSff vT PAcH Smith ?<??$ C9t,
856 F.2d 1097 (8th Cir. 1988) . Only if a prima facie case has been
established and there are sufficient inferences to raise the belief
that the actions taken were the result of discriminatory intent,
should the matter proceed.

See:

F.2d 793, 796 (9th Cir. 1982).

Cohen v. Fred Meyer. Inc., €86

Absent such a showing there is no

causal link under the third prong of the Love test. Petitioner has
failed to show this connection.
Petitioner's entire argument assumes that the ALJ was wrong
and never addresses the issue that a prima facie case was not met.
Petitioner admits no direct evidence exists and simply states that
there

are

"...numerous

examples,

including

procedural

irregularities, that cannot be explained outside of discriminatory
intent..." (Petitioner Brief, p. 18). This simple statement does
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not meet the prima facie test but is simply argument.
If this Court questions whether the ALJ correctly ruled,
Respondent's third argument discusses in great detail the findings
of the ALJ and the reasons why there is substantial evidence to
support them.

The recitation clearly discloses why the ALJ ruled

as he did.

There was no showing of discriminatory intent.

Policies were implemented as they were required to be implemented.
Even with those policies controlling, management gave Petitioner an
opportunity to change her schedule so that it would be more
acceptable yet Petitioner expressed no concern and asked for no
changes.

No

inappropriate

evidence
behavior

was
other

presented
than

which

Petitioner's

even
self

inferred
serving

statements of what she thought and how she felt. The fact that she
had never expressed her concerns, feelings, or complaints to
management and at trial changed her story from one of not being
able to obtain baby sitters to where baby sitting was no problem
goes to her credibility.
It is clear that the ALJ did not believe much of what
Petitioner stated.

Petitioner simply infers there are "numerous

examples" including "procedural irregularities" which she says can
not be explained by any other way than "there must have been
discrimination" in order to justify her claim that the ALJ was
wrong. There has been no showing what those irregularities are and
why the ALJ erred in not accepting Petitioner's version. There has
been no discussion why the ALJ's decision that there was no showing
of discriminatory intent was error.
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Petitioner has not met her burden on appeal to establish that
the ALJ was in error in his conclusion. She has neither marshaled
the evidence in favor of that ruling nor has she shown why the
conclusions drawn by the ALJ were inadequate,1
If this Court determines that the ALJ was in error in regard
to Petitioner meeting the prima facie test# however, the burden of
establishing discrimination remains firmly with Petitioner.

The

ALJ specifically held (R.49):
In any event, assuming that the employee did
make a prima facie the employer articulated
legitimate reasons why the Charging Party's
schedule was difficult and therefore it is
concluded that the Charging Party cannot
prevail.
The Utah Supreme Court in University of Utah v. Industrial
Commission of Utah, 736 P.2d 630

(Utah 1987) has adopted the

shifting burden of production, but held that the ultimate burden of
proving

discrimination,

under

the

Utah

Anti-Discrimination

statutes, remains squarely with the Petitioner or one claiming that
discrimination

took place.

The

court

held

that

even

if a

sufficient inference was raised to establish a prima facie case,
the employer had to simply supply evidence that "raises a genuine
issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against appellant" 736
1

It must be remembered that Petitioner is solely claiming
discriminatory action. This is not a constructive discharge (tort)
case.
The only reason the doctrine of constructive discharge
enters the picture is Petitioner's claim that the action taken is
"because of" a discriminatory intent which necessitated her
quitting. The Commission's jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. §§
34-35-6(1)(a) (i) and 34-35-7.1 deals with discrimination only, not
with general theories of employment law.
Therefore, absent a
showing of discrimination, the jurisdiction of the Commission and
the appellate review authority of this court ends.
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P.2d at 634. -Petitioner would then have to establish that the
reasons tendered were not legitimate. The ALJ held Petitioner had
failed to do this even if she had met the prima facie test.
Under University and Vpit^fl S t » W
Governors v. Aikens. 460 U.S. 711

Ppst?! gervt

(1983)

Bfl. Pf

(cited in State v.

Harrison. 805 P.2d 769# 777 (Utah App. 1991)), Petitioner would
still need to establish there was no substantial evidence to
support the findings and conclusion of the ALJ that there was no
discrimination. The ALJ held that under the totality of evidence,
Petitioner had not met the burden of proving by a preponderance of
the evidence that the legitimate reason presented by Respondent was
a pretext or was really not the reason. She had the obligation to
establish discriminatory intent.

This she also failed to do.

As a result, the ultimate determination of the case depends on
the trier of fact's determination of who to believe and whether
what is believed is credible.

The ALJ assessed the witnesses,

observed their demeanor and analyzed what evidence came forth. The
evidence presented at trial sustains the ALJ's decision that a
prima facie case had not been made.

A reviewing court does not

redetermine credibility or reweigh the record evidence, Questar
Pipeline Co. v. State Tax Comm'n. 850 P.2d 1175, 1178 (Utah 1993)
or substitute its judgment as between two reasonably conflicting
inferences

that

could

be

drawn

from

the

record

evidence,

Albertsons. Inc. v. Department Enrol. S e c . 854 P.2d 570, 575 (Utah
App. 1993).
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POINT II
PETITIONER'S FAILURE TO MARSHALL
FAVORABLE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE
ALJ's DECISION AND SHOW HOW IT
CANNOT BE RELIED ON NECESSITATES
SUSTAINING THE ALJT.'S DECISION
Petitioner has failed to adequately disclose and discuss the
vast evidence and testimony that is supportive of the decision of
the ALJ.

The issue before this Court

is whether there is

substantial evidence to support the findings and decision of the
ALJ#

not

whether

there

is

Petitioner's point of view.

substantial

evidence

to

support

It is here where Petitioner has again

failed to address one of the issues before this Court..
In Robb v. Anderton, 863 P.2d 1322# 1328 (Utah App. 1993)#
this Court held that it will not address a challenge to findings of
fact unless an appellant has properly marshaled the evidence.
According to Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n. 858 P.2d 1381,
1385 (Utah 1993), properly marshaling the evidence is a listing of
the evidence supporting the finding that is challenged. Thereafter,
the party so challenging the finding must

show that despite

supporting facts and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn
therefrom, the findings are not supported by substantial evidence
given the record as a whole.

In essence, a party so challenging

the findings must demonstrate that the findings of fact when viewed
in

the

light

most

favorable

to

insufficient to sustain the finding.

the

decision

are

legally

See: Stewart v. Board of

ftevjgw, 831 P.2d 134, 138 (Utah App. 1992); McPherson v. Belnap.
830 P.2d 302, 305 (Utah App. 1992).
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Petitioner clearly articulated her position as to why she
believes there is evidence to support her beliefs.

That, however

is not the appropriate standard for thin case.

The method

Petitioner has used to marshall evidence to support her position
has been rejected by this Court as improper in these cases-

See:

Intermountain Health Care. Inc. v. Board of Review, 839 P.2d 841,
844 (Utah App. 1992).
The Court of Appeals discussed what it expects in West Vallev
Citv v. Maiestic Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d 1311 (Utah App. 1991):
The marshaling process is not unlike
becoming the devil's advocate. Counsel must
extricate himself or herself from the client's
shoes and fully assume the adversary's
position. In order to properly discharge the
duty
of
marshaling
the
evidence,
the
challenger must present, in comprehensive and
fastidious order, every scrap of competent
evidence introduced at trial which supports
the very findings the appellant resistsAfter constructing this magnificent array of
supporting evidence, the challenger must
ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence.
818 P.2d 1311 at 1315 (emphasis added).
This Court will accept the findings of the Commission if there
has been a failure on the part of the Petitioner to adequately
marshal the evidence required in such cases.
Board of Review. 842 P.2d 910, 912

See:

Johnson v.

(Utah App. 1992).

Since

Petitioner has simply given lip service to the evidence supporting
the ALJ's findings without presenting supportive evidence in the
comprehensive and fastidious manner as required by the Court, it is
appropriate for the court to reject her argument and accept the
findings as set forth by the ALJ.
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Petitioner has failed to marshall the evidence as the Court
has required.

This Court should therefore reject Petitioner's

challenge to the ALJ's finding of no discriminatory purpose on the
ground that she has failed to identify the areas where the
supportive evidence relied on by the ALJ is not credible. m
POINT III
THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT
SUPPORTS THE FINDING OF THE ALJ THAT
RESPONDENT DID NOT DISCRIMINATE
AGAINST SHEIKH BECAUSE OF HER
PREGNANCY WHEN IT SET THE WORK
SCHEDULE
The

thrust

of

Petitioner's

argument

is

that

there

is

insufficient evidence to support the findings and conclusions of
the ALJ.

The ALJ,

after an extensive evidentiary hearing,

concluded that he believed^the reasons and explanations set forth
by the Respondent.
The ALJ's findings, while numbered,

tend to incorporate

several separate findings within individual paragraphs.

They do

not appear to follow any particular pattern of discussion.

Yet,

the findings do adequately address the issues he found important
and which adequately support his conclusion of no discrimination.
Because of the difficulty in separating each finding and
discussing it individually, Respondent has taken those findings
from the various paragraphs which have a commonality and will
discuss them in light of the record and show how the evidence is
substantial and reliable in support of the findings.
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1^
Findings 3. 4. and 21: The pppitjpn w?g Btrgggfvl wjt;h
frequent rotation. It had both positive and negative aspects which
were known to Sheikh who acknowledged so wh<*n she signed the
flepartmept'g jqfppp^tlgnal sheet,
It was common practice for employees to have lousy schedules.
Exhibit P-l#

R.201-218# shows exactly how everyone's schedule

changed, dating from September 30# 1989 to when Sheikh resigned.
Shook testified that she didn't believe that she ever prepared a
schedule that people liked (R.667).
Sheikh was aware of this fact and signed a Radio Dispatcher
Information sheet which contained the requirements of the position
(Exhibit R-4, R.381-3# Addendum C) . This document listed positives
and negatives of the job including the need to work myriads of
schedules, not being able to take breaks, having to go to work on
short notice, having to obtain child care at one hour's notice any
time of day or night, not being able to choose days off or shifts
among other things.

The ALJ's recitation of finding #3 basically

summarizes this document.

All the evidence elicited at trial

basically sustained the requirements contained in Exhibit R-4.
Sheikh testified that she had seen the document, read it,
signed it and*even underlined the certification above her signature
on page 3 of the document

(R.383) which says "considered each

factor listed" (R.545-8) . She acknowledged being told that she had
to work split shifts, varying shifts, had to get child care at an
hours notice and that she was told nothing new (R.547).
The position was very stressful to all employees (R.440) and
made life difficult for outside activities and social life because
of the various changing schedules (R.440).
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Sheikh was familiar

with these requirements and she knew what was expected of her
(R.548).

She had worked as a dispatcher for many years.

Double backs were worked commonly by individuals at the
center.

From January 1990 until when Sheikh returned to work,

Sheikh was the only employee who had worked no double backs at all
(R.468-9) while others worked the following double backs: Lisa 2, Marty - 4, Patti - 1# John - 1, Diane - 2, and Leah - 4 (R.468) .
Sheikh was scheduled to work three double backs for the three
weeks following her return because of the

policy that the person

having the afternoon shift would work the graveyard shift ifi the
assigned person could not work it (R.476, 552, 645, 676). Even
with the three double backs scheduled Sheikh worked none of them
(Exhibit P-l, pp R.217-18, Addendum G, R.469, 660).
Petitioner was not the only one with a lousy schedule and in
fact everyone at the center had constantly changing schedules.
Other workers had more double backs than Sheikh and worked them.
Sheikh knew the requirements of the job, accepted the positive and
negative aspects of the job and was scheduled pursuant to policy.
That policy was not established just for her, but was a long
standing policy. The fact that the entire center operation created
stress in employees' lives was something everyone lived with.
Stress was not created by the schedule Sheikh returned to.
The ALJ was correct in stating in Finding 21 that there was
absolutely no evidence that the policy on schedules, variation,
baby sitting, etc. (known since 1969 and accepted by Sheikh) was
applied toward her in a discriminatory manner.
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There was further

no evidence that this policy was applied in a discriminatory
pattern toward anyone as will be seen from the discussion that
continues.
Shifting

schedules, the difficulty of lifestyle and the

problems created to one's social life and routine were common place
with those who worked at the center.

There was nothing unique to

Sheikh in this regard. The evidence shows that Petitioner was not
doing anything different from other center dispatchers,
1*.
Finding 6: Purina a normal week, there were often daily
chances to the planned schedule due to sickness, vacation or
ypexpeptqfl emergencies Pf th<?p? scheduled t<? wppHt
There is no question that schedules didn't always work the way
they were planned (R.622). A normal schedule would be as typed up
(R.443) .

If no one requested time off, called in sick, or if

employees were never off other than scheduled days off the schedule
would work just as planned (R.443-4)• Hansen testified that there
might be one normal week all year because of the need to make
changes (R.444).

That certainly does not mean every time a pre-

planned schedule didn't work it was because of discrimination.
Such a claim would be absurd.

Every dispatcher had worked for

others who were sick or otherwise not able to meet their schedules
with personal emergencies.
Exhibit P-l, R.201-218, clearly shows numerous individuals who
were sick or otherwise took vacation.

Sometimes AJs were used.

Other times regular staff were used to fill in.

The department

never claimed that schedules didn't change - in fact it openly
acknowledged they did.
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A case in point is that of Petitioner Sheikh.

Sheikh was

scheduled for an afternoon shift on Monday, May 7, 1990 (Exhibit R1, R.378, Addendum E) when she returned to work.

She called in

sick and another employee, John Kelly was called in on his day off
to take her place (Exhibit P-l, R.217-18, Addendum G, R.470, 557,
657) . In that sense, it was not possible to tell John Kelly ahead
of time exactly what schedule he would be working.

Nonetheless,

John was given a particular schedule for the week (Exhibit R-l,
R.378, Addendum E) .

Had Sheikh not called in sick, Kelly would

have worked the schedule as planned and taken his day off.
This is different from the rotational schedule.
preplanned, approved and was in place.

That was

The normal schedule would

rotate so that planned days off and shifts to work would be known
ahead of time and specific days worked would be subject to
intervening incidents that would happen after the schedule was
prepared (R.622).

Shook followed the master schedule as much as

possible but made changes as necessary depending on the staffing
needs when employees took time off (R.642).
3.
Findings 6. 10 and 20: Fixed schedules and a two week
rotational schedule were not liked and created problems. After
dispatchers complained a new three week rotational schedule was
proposed and implemented. Sheikh knew of the new rotational scheme
and knew it would rotate and that she wouldn't have to work her
return schedule indefinitely.
At one time after the consolidation, the schedule was a
straight shift schedule which allowed employees to work the same
shift consistently

(R.541).

Such straight schedules went by

seniority (R.541) which turned out to be less than satisfactory for
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those with less seniority were unhappy with the least desirable
shifts (R.542).
After employees complained, a two week rotational schedule was
adopted

(R.554) which allowed each employee to work the same

schedule of shifts for two weeks before rotating to a different set
of shifts (R.530-1).
Employees again complained about the two week rotational
schedule in that it was too soon to rotate and did not give enough
time to adjust to one schedule before shifting to another (R.455).
The two week rotational schedule included what was called a "double
back" or "short change" which was working a second shift with only
8 or 9 hours between shifts (R.420, 425, 467).
After the employees complained of the two week rotational
being too burdensome, John Kelly prepared a suggested three week
rotational schedule

(Exhibit P-5, R.279, Addendum D ) .

Hansen

presented it to center employees for input, including Sheikh, in
February 1990, and it was adopted to be effective March 3, 1990
(Exhibit P-5, R.276-7, Addendum D) .

Sheikh was part of the

discussion process of implementing the three week rotational prior
to her leaving on maternity leave (R.456) and never complained
about the schedule (R.456, 684).
Hansen even sat down with Sheikh before Sheikh went on
maternity leave and used the three week rotational schedule that
had been preplanned (Exhibit R-l, R.378, Addendum E) and projected
the preplanned schedule Sheikh would return to in May (R.554).
This projection was based on the schedules that shifted one line
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down every three weeks - the very one relied on by Sheikh for the
schedule

she was

supposed

to return to.

Sheikh knew from

experience that the projected schedule (she had been on straight
shift, two week rotational shifts, and now three week rotational
shifts for years) was just that, a projected schedule subject to
change because of intervening events

(R.622).

There was no

testimony or indication that the three week rotational schedule
would ever end (R.589) or that any one schedule would continue
indefinitely.
Sheikh acknowledged that the schedule she was shown before
going on maternity was in force at the time she returned to work
(R.572).

Sheikh admitted going to the notebook kept in the center

for dispatcher's use to see if the schedule was still in force when
she returned to work (R.556).

She testified that after looking in

the notebook that the schedule was "obviously a rotating schedule"
(R.556).

Sheikh stated that she knew the schedule wasn't a fixed

schedule because she "new better" (R.557).

She further admitted

that the schedule she returned to was the exact schedule she had
planned on returning to except for the two graveyard shifts she was
asked to work each week because of the training of Russele (R.572) .
Sheikh acknowledged that she had seen Exhibit R-l (R.378,
Addendum E) which was in the book at the time she returned to work
which covered three three-week schedule changes beginning on 5-5-90
and ending 7-6-90 (R.378).
The ALJ in Finding 20 was correct in his conclusion that
Sheikh knew the schedule was rotating.
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He rejected Sheik's claim

that she had no knowledge or expectation that the schedule would
change. The purpose of preparing Exhibit R-l was so that employees
would know the planned schedules ahead of time (R.463).

Sheikh

knew the schedule rotated every three weeks beginning in March 1990
(R.521) and that it was the normal procedure for the schedule to
shift down every three wefeks so that everyone would shift to a
different schedule at the same time (R.553).
The rotating

schedule, Exhibit R-l,

(R.378, Addendum E)

continued through at least March 1991 (R.605) , over a year after it
was first implemented and eleven months after Sheikh resigned.
There is overwhelming evidence she knew her schedule would change.
Sheikh argues that

there was never an explanation from

Respondent why no one from 1989 to 1990 ever had such a schedule as
she.

Clearly the three week rotational schedule was implemented

effective the first of March 1990.

It had only been in existence

for two months when Sheikh returned to work. That would mean that
when she returned to work the schedule was going into its fourth
rotation (each rotation was three weeks).

It is certainly not

discriminatory for someone to have a schedule that no one else had
ever had when the rotational had only been in existence for a few
weeks and unique circumstances necessitated changes.

Because

Sheikh had been on maternity leave, she had not worked any of the
rotational shifts under the newly adopted plan.
Petitioner's Brief makes an interesting statement at Page 32
wherein is said:

"Sheikh alone...was given a schedule that no one

had ever been given before and no one was given at least for the
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first week following sheikh's termination,.." (emphasis added). Of
course no one had it before March 1990 because the same rotational
schedule did not exist and provide for such a possibility. And of
course no one had it in the 9 weeks preceding her return because
the circumstances had not repeated themselves.
Exhibit P-5 (R.276-7# Addendum D) shows the existence of seven
separate

schedules

that

would

rotate

every

three

weeks.

Eventually, the rotation would be complete after 21 weeks.

This

means that each employee who stayed with the department would be
scheduled for each preplanned schedule approximately every 21 v^eeks
before that dispatcher would repeat the entire rotation.
With Patti quitting when she did and Sandra off work having a
baby,

it

would

be

difficult

to

see

how

circumstances would exist again any time soon.

the

same

set

of

It becomes simply

a stretch of imagination to argue that because no one else had the
same problems through this new rotational schedule that somehow
management "planned11 to discriminate against her. To come to that
conclusion, one would have to ignore all the other evidence that
exists and which the ALJ soundly considered.

A*.

Ftotoq? Si 91 91 ar*3 14; The ?ris$ fligpgtcfr center w^s

inadequately staffed which created problems when employees were
unable to fill their shifts. Temporary employees could not be used
until full time employees were first used. Sheikh expressed no
concern about the schedule and accepted it.
The ALJ specifically found that the Price dispatch center was
not adequately staffed and there was

difficulty scheduling if

people took time off. This is certainly confirmed by Nancy Hansen#
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the center director, Lisa Shook, Sheikh's supervisor and Carol
Groustra, the state director over all centers (R.549-51, €39, 670).
Part time employees known as AJs could be used (R.448), but
there were restraints placed on their usage. There was no separate
budget for them (R.671).

Even Sheikh acknowledged knowing that

there were restrictions, but didn't know the specifics (R.560-1).
The center had to work with what it had (R.452) and could use
AJs only when absolutely necessary (R.452).

Department policy

dictated that temporaries could not be used until full time staff
had first been used or were unable to cover shifts (R.452, 630,
646, 657) . Shook had to determine whether current staff could meet
the schedule.
Shook called Sheikh before Sheikh's return to talk with her
about the schedule. Sheikh expressed some concern about the double
back (R.647) but did not request any change (R.647) . She was even
offered the option of working three graveyard shifts in a rovj
instead of two graveyards with the double back. Sheikh simply said
"no that's ok" (R.648).
Temporaries were not brought in because Sheikh expressed no
problem with being able to handle the schedule (R.609).

Shook

simply applied the policy of seeing if current staff could handle
the situation, asked Sheikh about it, was told Sheikh would handle
it and did nothing more about it.
It is not discrimination and no inference can be raised that
it is discrimination when a policy that is longstanding and is not
directed to any segment or class is used to solve a scheduling
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problem. The policy existed before Sheikh was pregnant and was not
implemented or used just because she was pregnant.
Sheikh never complained to Shook (R.692) and never requested
modification of her schedule (R.692) even though she knew that
Shook had the authority to change the schedule (R.692).

Sheikh

further never complained about her schedule to Hansen or Carol
Groustra, the State Coordinator for dispatch centers from her
return to work until the day of her resignation (R-594, 631, 649#
676) . There is no evidence that she asked for AJs to be used. The
use of AJs was never considered because there was no indication by
Sheikh as to her desire to have some help (R.609).
The fact that Sheikh was approached ahead of time, had the
opportunity to request changes and didn't cries for a rejection of
her claims.

The normal policy of seeing if current staff could

handle a particular problem was implemented.

Sheikh was asked if

she could perform the service and she agreed to do it.

Had she

expressed a concern, something could have been done about it
(R.630). Shook testified that had the issue been raised, a change
would have been made (R.668).
5.
Findings 6 and 12; New hire trainees created scheduling
problems in that thev could not work graveyard shifts alone. This
required the implementation of center policy to etfift the afternoon
schedule to work the cravevard shift.
It was the longstanding policy of the department to move
afternoon shift employees to the graveyard shift if it was not
possible for the assigned employee to fill the graveyard shift. It
is that simple. There was no gerrymandering or concoction of a new
procedure or policy targeted at Sheikh.
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To even argue such would

be dishonest. This itself sustains the ALJ's rejection of Sheikh's
claim and ruled there was not even an inference of discrimination.
It is not only a legitimate nondiscriminatory business reason for
the action but was ground enough to rule that Petitioner had not
met her burden of presenting a prima facie case.
While Sheikh was on maternity leave, Patti, another full time
dispatcher, quit her job (R.471) .

Sheikh knew that Patti was

intending to quit but did nothing to determine how that might
affect her return schedule (R.548) . With Patti quitting and Sheikh
on maternity leave, the center was down two permanent employees
.(R.466) . Patti was assigned to work the schedule immediately above
Sheikh's on the scheduling sheets provided to employees and placed
in the notebook for dispatchers to see
Addendum E) .

(Exhibit R-l, R.378,

Had Patti not quit, she would have worked the

schedule so indicated on that Exhibit when Sheikh returned to work
(R.378).
The center hired a new dispatcher, Russele, to replace Patti
(R.471). Russele was assigned to work Patti's schedule (Exhibit R1, R.378, Addendum E) . Russele began working mid April and when
Sheikh returned,

Russele was in training

for the dispatcher

position (R.432)•
It was department policy that a new trainee could not work a
graveyard shift alone (R.465, 673-4, 688) since that new employee
did not have the experience necessary to be alone.

As such,

Russele could not work graveyard shift during her training period
since she would be alone (R.465). Normally the training period was
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anywhere from £-8 weeks (R.411-12).

The bulk of the training for

the position consisted of working alongside experienced dispatchers
(R.411).
Exhibit R-l (R.378# Addendum E) shows that for the weeks that
Sheikh was scheduled to return, Russele's (Patti's former) schedule
called for Saturdays and Sundays to be graveyard shifts.

As

stated, Russele was in training and could not work the two
graveyard shifts (R.472).

Exhibit R-l (R.378, Addendum E) also

shows that on May 26# 1990 and June 16, when the schedule rotated
down to the next lines for the next two rotations

(R.625-6),

Russele had no graveyard shifts scheduled and could work regular
shifts with another experienced employee.
With Russele not being able to work graveyard shifts, Shook
was required to fill the graveyard shifts since the 24 hour service
center could not go without dispatchers (R.439-40).
As discussed above, the center did have some capacity to use
AJs (R.452), but department policy mandated that AJs could not be
used until full time staff had first been used or were unable to
cover shifts (R.452, 630, 646, 657). Shook asked Sheikh about the
double back and the modified schedule with no concern being
expressed about working them (R.648).

Shook did not schedule any

AJs since Sheikh expressed no problem with being able to handle the
modified schedule (R.609).
Shook therefore invoked center policy again to determine how
to staff the graveyard shifts which Russele could not fill. Center
and department policy was that if a person could not work the
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graveyard shift, for whatever reason (annual leave, sick leave,
training, emergency, etc,) the person who worked the afternoon or
3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. shift would be moved to the graveyard shift
(R.476, 552, 645, 676).

Sheikh testified that she was familiar

with the policy and that the practice was to shift that person to
graveyard (R.552-3).

She herself had been, required to shift down

before taking maternity leave (R.476). Everyone at the center had
been obligated to shift from afternoon to graveyard at some point
of time (R.476, 645). Sheikh had never been heard to complain of
that policy (R.685).
According to Exhibit R-l (R.378, Addendum E) , the schedule
Sheikh was scheduled to return to before leaving on maternity leave
(R.553) consisted of Sheikh working afternoon shifts for Saturdays,
Sundays and Mondays.

Russele was scheduled to work graveyard on

Saturdays and Sundays.
Shook 6imply invoked the long standing policy and shifted the
afternoon shift to the graveyard shift (R.476, 655).

The only

reason the schedule was changed was to meet the needs of the
trainee who could not work graveyard alone (R.602, 614) . There has
never been

any allegation that

the policy was not

followed

appropriately or that management purposely got Patti to quit so
that a "tough" schedule would be given to Sheikh.
simply

argues that

even though the policy was

implemented that it was discriminatory.
substance.
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Petitioner

appropriately

Such an argument has no

Sheikh testified that she was aware that she was scheduled for
afternoon and cnat pursuant to policy she was shifted down (R.560) .
From this recitation of evidence and testimony, it is clear
that Sheikh was not singled out and that the schedule was not
prepared to target her because she had been pregnant• Sheikh's own
admissions acknowledge that the policy invoked by Shook was in deed
the very policy that controlled and that her shifting down was
nothing more than the invocation of the policy in her case. That
does not create any discrimination or inference of discrimination.
The entire argument that it somehow does lacks for logic and reason
and supports the findings of the ALJ that the Department simply did
what its policy required and which Sheikh knew about.
6. Findings 7. 12, 13. 14, 15. 17 and 18:
Sheikh was
generally dissatisfied with her position. Sheikh was contacted
prior to her return and given an opportunity to have her schedule
Cfranqefl. She chose not to request a chance, didn't complain until
the date of her resignation, and, having the ability to do so. made
pp jffprt to rectify
what pftg ppw glajms wag »n untfflrt>JLg
pituatiQxi. The g?hed\4e w?s n?t SP riqprpvs ptterg *QVI$ not frftve

worKefl jti
After the county system consolidated with the State system,
Sheikh was never happy (R.685).

She preferred to work afternoon

shifts (3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m.) instead of other shifts (R.457,
521) • She didn't want to work a rotating schedule at all (R.630) .
She complained regularly before going on maternity leave about
schedules

(R.684) and told others that if she didn't like a

particular shift, she'd quit (R.684).

It was no different after

she returned from maternity leave (R.685).

She continued to be

unhappy there and it was no surprise to center dispatchers that she
quit (R.685).
34

By following the policy of shifting Sheikh from afternoon to
graveyard#

a double back or a short change between the Sunday

graveyard shift and the Monday afternoon shift was created (Exhibit
R-l, R.378, Addendum E) .

The double back would have lasted for

only three weeks because the schedule rotated down one line two
days after Sheikh quit.
next two rotations.

Russele had no graveyard shifts for the

Sheikh would have basically had day shifts

during the next rotational period of time (R.455) had she stayed.
For this three week period, however, a difficult schedule was
assigned to Sheikh (R.600).

If John Kelly's name had been where

Sheikh's name was, he would have been assigned to work the schedule
instead of Sheikh (R.628)•
Kelly testified that he would not have been surprised to be
assigned such a schedule

(R.689), that it would have been no

surprise to have worked two graveyard with a double back the third
day

(R.689).

He

stated:

"That

would

be

normal

for

the

circumstances" (R.689). Even though he wouldn't have liked it, he
would have worked it (R.689).
While Sheikh testified that she didn't believe that anyone
could work that schedule (R.690), such was purely speculation and
Shook, her supervisor testified that she could not say for certain
that no one had never worked that type of schedule (R.667) . Hansen
testified that the schedule was not unreasonable under the
circumstances (R.600) and that she believed a reasonable person
would have worked it (R.601).
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Because the double back was created# Shook knew there might be
concern regarding that schedule

(R.663) which the Department

admitted was a difficult schedule (R.600)•

As such, Shook called

Sheikh a few days before her scheduled return to tell her of the
shift change necessitated by# Russele's training

(R.646) which

reason Sheikh openly acknowledged was told her at that time
(R.566) . As noted before, Shook testified that Sheikh expressed no
concern about the graveyard shift change (R.646), inquired about
the double back

(R.647), but did not ask the double back be

alleviated or modified (R.647).
Shook even offered to allow Sheikh to work three graveyard
shifts in a row (Saturday, Sunday, and Monday), thereby changing
her Monday afternoon shift to do away with the double back, but
Sheikh simply said wno that's ok" (R.648).

This offer would have

provided three graveyard shifts, two days off, then two morning
shifts (Exhibit R-l, R.378, Addendum E) . Sheikh testified that she
knew that Shook had authority to change the schedule (R.692), but
openly admitted that she did not ask Shook to do so (R.692).
As to the schedule itself, Sheikh acknowledged that other than
the two graveyard shifts she was assigned to work pursuant to
policy, the other three shifts were exactly the davs she was
scheduled to work as part of her regularly assigned rotation
schedule (R.568).

She stated that the entire schedule did not

change, only the Saturday and Sunday shifts (R.579).
Additionally, Sheikh never made her concerns known (if she had
any) to Shook or Hansen until the day she resigned, May 10, 1990
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(R.531) •

Shook was not aware of any problems or concerns until

after the resignation when Hansen told her of the resignation
(R.660).
When Sheikh expressed concern about the difficulty in getting
baby sitters (R.490)f Hansen told her that she could trade shifts
with other dispatchers

(R.495) which Sheikh had done before

(R.596). Hansen's permission to do so wasn't even needed (R.495).
Sheikh presented no testimony that she had even tried this route.
Sheikh asked for straight shifts

(something no other non

manager dispatcher had) but was told that was not possible (R.,4912, 595) . The only individuals who had straight shifts were Hansen,
the center manager and day supervisor and Shook who was the
afternoon supervisor (R.426, 448, 637). Sheikh further asked if
there was the possibility to job share with someone else (this
would have been less than a full time job) but was told such was
not available in the centers (R.490-1, 675). Sheikh also did not
ask for more time off (R.492, 557).
Both Hansen and Shook testified that had Sheikh raised her
concerns about the schedule or the double back something could have
been done

(R.630, 668).

A modification could have been made

(R.631-2, 648), but Sheikh never complained or requested a change
(R.631, 563). Carol Groustra, the State manager over all dispatch
centers, who knew Sheikh, also testified that Sheikh never called
her to complain or ask for modification (R.676).

No AJs were

scheduled because Sheikh expressed no concern with handling the
schedule (R.609).
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When she resigned, she had not complained of the schedule to
any of her superiors (R.594, 649, 676), never asked for a change to
the schedule (R.630, 653) and never mentioned anything regarding
pressure, anxiety, tension or concerns regarding safety of those
she serviced (R.453, 597).
Sheikh had opportunity to change the schedule, kept quiet and
admittedly did not ask Shook, the person in charge of making the
schedule and who had called her with the changes, to make any
changes. While management realized the difficulty of the schedule,
contact was made, explanations as to the reasons for the schedule
were given and Sheikh was given the opportunity to request changes
in the schedule.

This she did not do.

These actions are consistent with good management.
because

a

difficult

schedule

is

dictated

by

policy

circumstances does not indicate or infer discrimination.
was a good dispatcher
(R.436-38).

Simply
and

Sheikh

(R.664) and had satisfactory appraisals

It made good sense and appropriate management policy

to check with Sheikh to see what effect the schedule change would
have on her and whether she had any concern.

If an employee

expresses no concern or complaint and requests no modification,
management should not be expected to further complicate an already
complicated matter without reason. Sheikh rejected every offer to
modify the schedule.
The things Sheikh requested (job share or straight shift) went
to Sheikh's ability to obtain baby sitters and were not addressed
at the difficulty of her return schedule
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(Exhibit R-2, R.379,

Addendum F, and testimony at R.489-90).

Sheikh further testified

that she wasn't able to spend enough time with her young baby
(R.558).

At trial she then contradicted herself and claimed that

it was the terrible schedule and that baby sitting was not a
problem

because of her mother and husband

(R.557-8).

Such

testimony was not credible'and was rejected by the ALJ.
2Lu Finding 19 and 20: Sheikh would have rotated out of the
schedule she did not like three weeks after she returned to work
and would have eventually rotated through all schedules, gfrg fagw
the schedule would rotate.
Two days after Sheikh resigned, the schedule shifted to the
next rotation (R.605) and had she not resigned, she would have
worked in the next rotation which contained no double backs, no
graveyards and was pretty much straight days (Exhibit R-l, R.378,
Addendum E, R.473-4). A review of Russele#s new schedule two days
after Sheikh resigned, shows that Russele was not scheduled for any
graveyard shifts and therefore there was no need to shift anyone to
those shifts to cover for her (Exhibit R-l, R.378, Addendum E) •
Testimony elicited at trial indicated clearly that if Sheikh had
stayed with the center, she would have eventually worked all of the
various schedules just as everyone else would have also shifted
through all of the various schedules (R.406, 683).
Sheikh had participated in the formulation of the three week
rotational policy and was personally aware it rotated every three
weeks (R.486, 521, 581). She had been a dispatcher for ten years
(R.513) and had worked all sorts of schedules over that period of
time. Sheikh acknowledged that before she went on maternity leave
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she knew the schedule rotated every three weeks (R.554) and that
Hansen had gone over the rotating schedule with her (R.553).
When Sheikh returned she even looked in the notebook in the
center and testified that it was wobviously a rotating schedule"
(R.556). She further knew she wasn't on a fixed rotating schedule
which would never change because she "knew better11 (R.557) . Sheikh
further testified that even though no one told her specifically
upon her return that the schedule would rotate down, she did not
count down three weeks to see where she would be (R.555) and never
asked anyone if the schedule would change

(R.555-6).

Sheikh

acknowledged that the schedule she came back to was in fact the
schedule she was originally told (through rotation) except for the
two graveyard shifts that she worked because of Russele's training
(R.572) .
Neither of Sheikh's supervisors should have been required to
tell her the shift

changed, particularly

since Sheikh never

indicated to either of her supervisors that the reason she quit was
because of the schedule - only the inability to get baby sitters.
The schedule Sheikh complained about was temporary in nature
and pursuant .to policy would have shifted automatically.
&*. Findings 16 and 18: Sheikh did not work any of the
schedule complained of, did not work anv of the short chances and
took herself out of the problem through using measures available to
her.
Sheikh never worked

any

double backs

she

complains

so

vigorously about (R.469# 501f €60). As seen on Exhibit P-l, (pp.
R.217-218, Addendum G), the first Monday back after the two
graveyard shifts were not worked. This is seen by the W-7 (7 hours
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leave without pay) and 1-V (1 hour annual leave). Thus# no double
back or short change was worked by Sheikh.

For the next two sets

of Saturdays and Sundays she called in sick as designated as "sick"
or W meaning off without pay.
After the resignation, Shook and Hansen figured that Sheikh
would not show up for the graveyard shifts remaining (R.408# €59) .
Whenever she was so scheduled, she called in sick (R.659) . It was
known that Sheikh had done the same thing when she had been
scheduled for some graveyard shifts earlier
called in sick frequently

(R.659).

She had

(R.664) and Sheikh's co-workers had

complained a lot about her calling in sick (R.665). Therefore, it
was not unreasonable for the ALJ to disbelieve Sheikh by stating in
his findings that she was not ill.
While Sheikh claimed illness, her supervisors doubting that
fact, never confronted Sheikh about it because she had already
given her notice of resignation (R.660).
Because Sheikh called in sick she only worked four days the
first week back, three days the second week back, and only two days
the last week back (Exhibit P-l, pp. R.217-18, Addendum G) . Other
than the first two graveyard shifts she worked under the modified
schedule for Russele, every shift she worked the remainder of the
time she was with the Department was a day that she was told in
March (before she left on maternity leave) she would work when she
returned (See: Exhibit R-l, R.378, Addendum E, and Exhibit P-l, pp.
R.217-18, Addendum 6 ) .

Sheikh so acknowledged as she testified

(R.567).
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Sheikh did what she had done before - took time off.

In

essence she never "had to" and never "did" work the schedule
complained about.
actions.

She was not questioned or confronted about her

Even if it could be .believed that the schedule was

intentionally planned toward Sheikh, Sheikh had it in her own power
to ameliorate the schedule.

She could call in sick (like she had

done before), she could trade with other dispatchers (which she
knew about), or she could have asked Shook for a change in schedule
to help her out (which she knew she could do).

While she neither

traded shifts nor requested a modification in schedule, she did
call in sick and provided a way to temporarily overcome the
problems with what she now says was an intolerable schedule.
Sheikh and Hansen never even questioned her calling in and there is
no evidence that any negative action was planned or taken.
Being scheduled to work a schedule without any recourse or
opportunity to change the circumstances is one thing. To accept a
schedule without making any attempt to modify it when opportunities
to do so were available is another thing.

Here, Sheikh took

advantage of options available that were over and above those
offered to remove herself from the schedule she now complains
about.

The ALJ was absolutely correct

in his findings and

conclusions that she neither worked the double backs but also
removed herself from the situation causing her concern.

That is

not discrimination and any claim of such should be rejected and the
conclusions of the ALJ sustained.
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ORAL ARSUMENT/PUBLICATION OP OPINION
Oral argument is not requested because Respondent does not
believe it necessary in this case. A published opinion is also not
requested because the nature of the case does not

deem it

necessary*

CPNCWBIMT
As has been stated, there is not only substantial evidence,
but overwhelming evidence to support each of the findings and
conclusions of the ALJ as well as the legitimate inferences that
can be drawn from them. Petitioner has not marshaled the evidence.
The implementation of clear and longstanding policies to solve
temporary staffing problems is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
practice. The ALJ was correct in the conclusion he made that there
was no discriminatory intent and properly rejected Petitioner's
argument.
Petitioner has simply argued her position as an advocate as if
this matter was still at the trial level. She has pointed out what
she believes is evidence supporting her position without marshaling
and analyzing the evidence supportive of the ALJ's decision. It is
clear that Petitioner failed to meet her prima facie burden, for
taken as a whole, there was neither discrimination nor even an
inference of discrimination.
This Court should reject in total her argument and sustain the
Decision of the Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial
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Commission.

This Court should award costs and attorneys fees to

the State for having to defend this matter on appeal.
DATED this z S ^ day of April, 1995.

JTEPHEN~B7HSCHWENDXMft»
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Respondent
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing
Brief of Respondents this .SV^day of April 1994 to Counsel for
Petitioner, Suzanne West, 3269 South Main Street, #270, Salt Lake
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ADDENDUM A
Administrative Law Judge Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order, September 9,
1993

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. UADD NO. 90-0467
EEOC NO. 35C-90-0413
*

SANDRA SHEIKH,

FINDINGS OF FACT
Charging Party,

*
*
*

vs.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

8TATE OF UTAH / UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY,
Respondent.
*

*

* *

i

: *

*

*

*r

*

* *

*
*
4
*
* *

HEARING:

Hearing Room 332, Industrial Commission of Utah,
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah on August
27, 1993, at 8:30 o'clock a.m.
Said hearing
pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Benjamin A.^ Sims, Administrative Lav Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The Charging Party, Sandra Sheikh, was present and
represented by Suzanne West, Attorney at Lav.
The respondent employer, State of Utah Department
of Public Safety, was represented by Stephen 6.
Schvendiman, Assistant Attorney General.

This case involves a claim of sex discrimination because of
pregnancy and maternity leave and the Charging Party requests that
she be reinstated to her position, that she receive back pay from
the claimed time of constructive discharge at a salary level biweekly of $638.40 plus 10% interest per year on the salary, and in
addition, reasonable attorney's fees.
FINDINGS OF FACT:
1. The Charging Party, Sandra Sheikh, was earning $638.40 biweekly, and was receiving state paid employee benefits in the
amount of $186.36 bi-weekly.
2. The Charging Party had been given credit for working for
the state government (Department of Public Safety) of approximately
ten and one-half years at the time of alleged constructive
discharge.
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3. While there are positive aspects to the radio dispatcher
position which was held .by the Charging Party, the negative aspects
of the position were shown to be, among others, that it was an
extremely stressful position requiring frequent rotation into
different shifts including graveyard, and what are called ••short
change" shifts. There are no more than eight hours rest between
such "short change" shifts. In addition, the evidence shows that
a dispatcher may not be able to leave his/her worksite without
proper coverage; may be unable to schedule his/her own breaks; may
have limited opportunity to socialize with co-workers during
his/her work shift; may be required to work any of three shifts or
cover shifts on short notice; may be required to work weekends on
a regular basis; may be unable to choose the days off or shifts;
may have to work split days off during a work week; may have to
procure child care at one hour's notice anytime £ay or night; may
have to get child care for weekends, holidays, and the middle of
the night on a regular basis; may have to be prepared to work
immediately when his/her shift begins; and may have to cancel days
off or holiday plans on short notice.
Also among other
requirements, may have to handle life threatening emergency
situations on the radio involving police and other people while
maintaining a calm professional demeanor; must answer and respond
to calls for ambulance or paramedics and be able to help the person
by giving instructions.
4. On October 26, 1989, the Charging Party acknowledged by
signature that she had read and considered three pages of factors
such as those heretofore mentioned.
5. Prior to the consolidation of county and state dispatch
functions in 1988, the Charging Party worked for the county
sheriff's office. In 1988, after the consolidation of services,
various dispatch organizations were combined into a state
organization under the Utah Department of Public Safety.
6. After consolidation, a fixed schedule for dispatchers was
attempted based on seniority. The Charging Party probably had the
most or the second most seniority. The fixed system of scheduling
was changed because junior employees never got weekends off, and
were often relegated to working graveyard shifts. During a normal
week, there were often daily changes to the schedule due to
sickness and other requirements, such as vacation, compensatory
time and unexpected emergencies in the staff's personal life. When
a member of the shift called in sick, another member was normally
asked to come in. The routine to cover the unscheduled events was
that an earlier shift would be transferred to the later shift. For
example, the 3 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. shift would be transferred to the
11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift in the event the 3:00 p.m. to 11:00
p.m. shift was unable to come to work.
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7. Lisa Shook and .Nancy Allred worked fixed shifts only since
-they were supervisory personnel.
8.
if money was available within certain personnel
constraints, part-timers known as "A.J." personnel could be used to
cover the shifts, but only if full-time personnel were first used.
9. The evidence shows that the Price dispatch office had
little or no personnel resource slack and in the event that one or
more people called in unavailable for duty there was a scheduling
problem created.
10. The Charging Party became pregnant sometime in 1989 and
her delivery date was established as March 8,,1990.
She duly
requested maternity leave and Lisa Shook, shift supervisor, was
informed in September 1989. Lisa Shook was also pregnant at the
time. The dispatchers often complained about the schedules and as
a result, John Kelly, a dispatcher, came up with a "better" system
of scheduling. That system was later adopted by a second level
supervisor, Nancy Allred. This new schedule was completed and
implemented with the modification to allow a three week rotational
period rather than the two week rotation, after the employees felt
that two weeks was insufficient time to adjust to shift changes.
11. The Charging Party left her position to take maternity
leave effective March 4, 1990 at which time she was under the
impression that she would be returning to work on a swing shift on
May 5, 1990. However, she returned on May 4, 1990.
12. A few days prior to her return, the Charging Party was
called by Lisa Shook, the first level supervisor, who informed her
(the Charging Party) that she would return to work on the following
schedule:
Friday, May 4, 1990 - 8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. (CPR
Training), and 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.; Saturday, May 5, 1990 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.; Sunday, May 6, 1990 - 11:00 p.m. to 7:00
a.m.; Monday, May 7, 1990 - 4:00 p.m. to 12:00 midnight; Tuesday,
May 8, 1990 - off; Wednesday, May 9, 1990 - off; Thursday, May 10,
1990 - noon to 8:00 p.m.; Friday, May 11, 1990 - 3:00 p.m. to 11:30
p.m.; Saturday, May 12, 1990 - 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.; Sunday, May
13, 1990 - 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.; Monday, May 14, 1990 - 4:00
p.m. to midnight; Tuesday, May 15, 1990 - off; Wednesday, May 16,
1990 - off; Thursday, May 17, 1990 - 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.;
Friday, May 18, 1990 - 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.; Saturday, May 19,
1990 - 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.; Sunday, May 20, 1990 - 11:00 p.m.
to 7:00 a.m.; Monday, May 21, 1990 - 4:00 p.m. to 1:00 a.m.;
Tuesday, May 22, 1990 - off; Wednesday, May 23, 1990 - off;
Thursday, May 24, 1990 - 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.. This schedule
resulted because, among other problems, a trainee by the name of
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Russell was hired and trainees created special scheduling problems
since they could not be alone during a six to eight week training
period.
13. This schedule was admittedly difficult, but the evidence
shows that the scheduling conditions in the dispatch office were
general onerous. John Kelly, a fellow dispatch employee, testified
that although it was a rigorous schedule, he would not have been
surprised to have received it, and he would have worked it.
14. Although the Charging Party felt that the schedule was
made as "punishment", neither at the time of Ms. Shook's telephone
call nor thereafter did the Charging Party tell Ms. Shook that she
could not or would not work the assigned schedule. Because Ms.
Shook knew that the schedule was difficult, she.made an offer to
the Charging Party that the Charging Party could work graveyard in
order to avoid the double back or short change schedule.
15. The second level supervisor, Nancy Allred, was not aware
that the Charging Party wafe unhappy about the schedule until May
10, 1990. The Charging Party made no request to do anything about
the schedule until May 10th on which date she asked for either job
sharing or a fixed schedule. There was no job sharing authorized
in the Utah dispatch function during this time period. Ms. Allred
told the Charging Party that she could ask others to trade and that
could be done without an okay from Ms. Allred. Trading shifts was
established routine in the dispatch office, and no advance
supervisory approval was required. There was no evidence that the
Charging Party attempted to ask others to trade shifts.
16. The Charging Party did not work any other of the short
change shifts. She did work the graveyard shift on May 4, 5, and
6th, but did not work that shift on May 10, 12, 13, 19 or the 20th.
She did not work on May 7th, rather she took time off without pay
for seven hours and took one hour of vacation leave. On Tuesday
and Wednesday, May 8th and 9th, respectively, she had no scheduled
shifts. On May 10th she worked from 1200 to 2000 hours. On May
11th, she worked from 1500 to 2330 hours. On Saturday and Sunday
May 12th and 13th, she called in sick. She worked on Monday from
1600 to 2400. She was off on Tuesday and Wednesday. On Thursday,
she worked from 0800 until 1600, and on Friday, May 18th, she
worked from 0900 to 1700 hours. On the 19th and 20th the Charging
Party was off without pay. On May 21, 1990, she worked from 1600
to 0100 hours. She was off on May 22nd and 23d; on May 24th she
worked from 0800 until 1600 and after that point she did not work
since she had voluntarily resigned on May 10, 1990, and gave the
respondent a two week notice.
17.

Although there was evidence that the Charging Party had
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been dissatisfied with her job as a dispatcher ever since the job
had been consolidated into a state operation, there was no evidence
that the dissatisfaction resulted from any illegal discrimination
against any employee prior to the allegations of this current
complaint.
18. There vas no indication that the Charging Party took
advantage of the opportunity to request that other employees
substitute for her in this admittedly difficult work schedule. The
Charging Party did use self help measures to take herself out of
this schedule by calling in sick even though she vas not. There
vas no evidence that any adverse action vas taken or vas^ being
contemplated as a result of her action. To the contrary, there vas
evidence that management considered her to be a good employee.
19. Had the Charging Party vaited through the rotation period
of three veeks she vould have rotated to the next position since
all employees vould rotate through all the various schedules and
the rotation vas based on a three veek period.
20. The Charging Party vas avare of this rotation although
she claimed that no one told her that she vould not have to vork
this schedule indefinitely.
21. The Charging Party claims that the evidence vhich shows
the discriminatory basis against vomen vas indicated by the policy
that employees vould have to be on the job and vould have to
arrange for short notice child care. In addition, the Charging
Party states that Ms. Allred got upset vhen she vas informed that
the Charging Party vas pregnant since the schedule vould have to be
modified again. However, Ms. Allred did not make the schedule
which the Charging Party found to be "intolerable."
Another
pregnant supervisor made the schedule, and there vas no evidence
that the schedule vas made at the direction of Ms. Allred. This
former condition of employment vas known to the Charging Party as
early as 1989 when she signed a document acknowledging this fact.
That document was written in gender neutral terms and there is no
indication that the policy was ever applied in a discriminatory
fashion. The latter evidence, although not corroborated, but even
if believed does not rise to the level of showing motivation for
discrimination since more than eight weeks had passed between the
event and the Charging Party's return to work on the schedule in
question, and since Ms. Allred did not make the schedule.
LEGAL DISCUSSION:
A disparate treatment case requires a showing, through direct
or circumstantial evidence, of an intent to discriminate that shows
that the employer was motivated by an improper and discriminatory
—
.t- w*_ -*«*„,*.
* n Moiovftft in a disparate treatment
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employment discrimination case has the initial burden to establish
a prima facie showing of the employer's discrimination.
Thereafter, the burden- of production shifts to the employer to
articulate some legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the
conduct in question. If the employer succeeds, the burden of
production shifts back to the employee to show that the reasons
articulated by the employer were mere pretext for discrimination.
Despite the shifting of the burden of production in the disparate
treatment discrimination cases, the burden of persuasion remains
with the Charging Party throughout the case.
In order to establish a prima facie case, the Charging-Party
must show that she was a member of a group protected by UCA § 3435-6; that she was qualified for the job; that she was
constructively discharged, despite her qualifications, and as a
part of the constructive discharge, she must show .that a reasonable
person would view the working conditions as intolerable*.
The Charging Party was a member of a group protected by UCA
S34-35-6. She applied for and was granted a maternity leave based
on pregnancy during the period in question. There was never any
dispute during the course of the hearing that she was qualified for
her job. The major issue was whether the employer discriminated
against the Charging Party by adverse job action and if so, whether
the conditions were so unreasonable that she was justified in
discharging herself from those conditions.
Although the schedule the Charging Party complains of was
difficult, she failed to take action such as asking others to work
her shifts which was permissible, or to simply wait for the
rotational process to obtain a better work schedule. She did call
in sick, and took herself out of the more difficult parts of the
schedule. There was no evidence that any adverse action was taken
against her or was even being contemplated. In addition, she had
the means within her control to properly modify the schedule to her
liking by asking other workers to trade shifts, but there was no
evidence that she made any attempt to change the schedule beyond
asking the supervisor to modify it.
There was no indication in testimony at the hearing that the
employer ever singled out the Charging Party simply because she was
pregnant or had been pregnant.
According to testimony, the
Charging Party would have rotated out of the schedule as all
employees rotate through all the schedules of the shifts with each
employee's schedule being approximately three weeks in length.
The employer articulated legitimate reasons for the schedule
such as the fact that they had at least one and on occasion two
vacancies during the previous several months that training of a new
employee necessitated schedule aberrations and the normal process
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of people being sick. The necessity of changing the schedule was
evident since during the time that the schedule was in operation,
the Charging Party called in sick on a number of occasions during
this period simply because she •did not like the schedule, and other
dispatch employees had to substitute for her on short notice.
Although the schedule in question deviated from one of the normal
shifts, the employer satisfactorily explained the aberrations.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
1. During the evidentiary hearing it was determined that the
Charging Party had barely managed to make a prima facie case _ U p o n
retrospect, and considering the total evidence, it is apparent that
the balance must shift in favor of determining that the employee
failed to make a prima facie case in this matter. In any event,
assuming that the employee did make a prima facie the employer
articulated legitimate reasons why the Charging Party's schedule
was difficult and therefore it is concluded that the Charging Party
cannot prevail.
The employer, the State of Utah, the Utah
Department of Public Safety did not discriminate against Sandra
Shiekh because of her pregnancy, and her work schedule for the
period May 4 through May 24, 1993, although difficult was not
intolerable.
Ms. Shiekh's resignation was therefore not a
constructive discharge. There was therefore no discriminatory or
unfair employment practices under UCA Sect. 34-35-6(1)(a).
ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Charging Party, Sandra
Sheikh, has failed to establish a prima facie case in the claim of
discrimination by her employer, the State of Utah, Department of
Public Safety, and thus that claim should be and is hereby
dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the
foregoing shall be filed in writing with the Industrial Commission
of Utah within thirty (30) days of the date hereof, specifying in
detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless so filed,
this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. In
the event a Motion for Review is timely filed, the parties shall
have fifteen (15) days from the date of filing with the Commission,
in which to file a written response with the Commission in

SANDRA SHEIKH
ORDER
PAGE EIGHT
accordance with Section 63-46b-12(2), Utah Code Annotated.
Dated this

5 _

^ y .of

s^x7jt~

. 1993.

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

n A. Sims
strative Lav Judge

CERTIFICATE OF HAILING

I hereby certify that on the Jj
. day of September, 1993, the
attached ORDER in the case of Sandra"Sheikh was mailed, postage
pre-paid to the following persons at the following addresses:
Sandra Sheikh
1101 S Carbon Ave #73
Price UT 84501
Suzanne West, Atty
455 E 500 S
Salt Lake City UT 84111
Stephen Schwendiman, Assistant AG
36 S State - 11th Floor
Salt Lake City UT 84111
Anna R Jensen, Director
UADD
UIC

*

~/f)f \r
y
[J^uX^^^P^

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

June s. Harrison, Paralegal
Adjudication Division

/jsh
sheikh

ADDENDUM B
Order Denying Motion For Review, August 25, 1994

TEE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
SANDRA SHEIKH,

*

Charging Party,
VS.

*
*
*

ORDER DENYING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

STATE OF UTAH/UTAH DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC SAFETY,

*
*

UADD NO. 90-04€7
EEOC NO. 35C-90-0413

Respondent.

*

This matter is before the Industrial Commission of Utah
pursuant to the Motion For Review filed by Sandra Sheikh, seeking
review of an Administrative Law Judge's Order which dismissed Ms.
Sheikh's charge of unlawful discrimination against the State of
Utah's Department of Public Safety.
The Commission exercises jurisdiction over this Motion For
Review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §3435-7.1(11) and Utah Admin. Code R560-1-4.A.5.
BACKGROUND
Ms. Sheikh filed a complaint with the Utah Antidiscrimination
Division ("UADD") charging that the Utah Department of Public
Safety ("Public Safety") unlawfully discriminated against her
because of pregnancy.
After an investigation, UADD found
reasonable cause to believe"that Ms. Sheikh had been subjected to
unlawful discrimination due to her pregnancy.
Public Safety requested and was granted an evidentiary
hearing.
After a lengthy hearing with several witnesses and
numerous items of documentary evidence, the ALJ concluded that Ms.
Sheikh had failed to establish a : prima facie case of
discrimination. Ms. Sheikh then filed hfer Motion For Review with
the Commission. In her Motion For Review, Ms. Sheikh argues that
the preponderance of the evidence does not support the ALJ's
findings and that the findings themselves are inadequate.
riFPIWgS py TACT
The Commission adopts the findings of fact set for*:* in the
decision of the ALJ.

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW
SANDRA SHEIKH
PAGE TWO
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Section S34-35-6 of Utah's Anti-Discrimination Act sets forth
the "discriminatory or prohibited employment practices" which are
prohibited by the Act:
(1) It is a discriminatory or prohibited employment
practice:
(a) (i) for an employer to . . • discriminate in
matters of . . . conditions of employment against any
person otherwise qualified, because of . . • pregnancy,
childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions. . . . .
(emphasis added.)
Ms. Sheikh argues that Public Safety assigned her an unusually
difficult work schedule as punishment for taking maternity leave.
However, for the various reasons detailed in his decision, the A U
concluded otherwise. The ALJ found, and the commission agrees,
that Ms. Sheikh's schedule was not motivated by a discriminatory
purpose, but by the employer's staffing needs. Furthermore, Ms.
Sheikh did not take advantage of opportunities to modify the
schedule.
Finally, the* staffing problems that caused the
difficulties with Ms. Sheikh's schedule would have been resolved
within a few weeks.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, the Commission denies Ms. Sheikh's
Motion For Review and affirms the ALJ's decision.
It is so
ordered.

IMPORTANT* NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL RIGHTS FOLLOWS ON NEXT PAGE

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW
SANDRA SHIEKH
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Any party may ask the Commission to reconsider this Order by
filing a request for reconsideration with the Commission within 20
days of the date of this Order. Alternatively, any party may
appeal this Order by filing a Petition For Review with the Court of
Appeals within 30 days of the date of this Order.
CERTIFICATE OF HAILING
I, Alan Hennebold, certify that I did mail by
class postage, except as noted below, a copy of the
MOTION FOR REVIEW in the case of Sandra Sheikh v.
Department of Public Safety. Case Number 90-0467, on
August, 1994, to the following;
Suzanne West, Attorney
MCDONALD, WEST & BENSON
455 E. 500 S.
Salt Lake City, Utah '84111

prepaid first
ORDER DENYING
State of Utah
the^CQ ay of

Stephen Schwendiman, Attorney
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE
4120 State Office Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

Diane Kearrfs
Industrial Commission of Utah

ah\90-0467oA

ADDENDUM C
Exhibit R-4, Utah Department of Public Safety
Radio Dispatcher Supplemental Information,
signed by Sandra Sheikh, October 26, 1989

M'Cfc DPS COMM.

TEL:801-965-493?

Sep 06.90

23:33 No.004 P.15

OTAK PEPASTKEKT Of EPBLIC SkTVTt
PAD20 DISPATCHER
SUPPLSKEKTXI. ZRFOXKATZON

*hia supplemental information ie being provided to you to you may
decide if e position •• e ftedio Dispatcher ie the best career choice for
you. We ask that you read it carefully, sign and return it to ee prior to
testing for this position.
Experience has shown that many applicants for Radio Dispatcher consider
only the positive aspects of the position* while not knowing or ignoring
•one of its less attractive features* As a result* when new employee*
encounter the negative* they sometimes raaet by leaving the job well before
training is complete, tarly resignations* which result frem leek of
accurate Job knowledge, contribute to a such higher attrition rate and
higher training ooata for the Department ef public Safety than la desirable.
While there are aany satisfying and rewarding aspeete to the Jtedio
Dispatcher position* and there la no question that dispatchers sake a
significant contribution to the welfare and safety of their fellow cltlsens*
it i§ important for applicants to carefully consider both the negative and
the positive features before deciding to test for the position.
The job fectors listed below are festures ef the Radio Dlepateher
position. Zf any ef theee faetora present problems for you, we atrongly
suggest that you consider alternative employment cboleea which nay better
fit your career goals.
WOSSIWC EKVIRPKKEKT
• •• enable to physically leave your work cite (I.e., walk around, use
the restreon* get a drink* cnoke* etc.) at any time without proper
coverage ef your position.
• be unable to leave your position to tat lunch.
• be enable to schedule your own breaka.
• be enable to sacks inside the building.
• Save limited opportunity to socialite with co-workers er ethers during
your work shift.
• work within an organisation structured en a allitery model (i.e., aaey
have to wear a uniform and confers to growing standardet work through
a highly structured ehaln-of-command* during the probationary period*
be regularly reminded ef errors and mietakes in order to meet strict
performance standardet submit to written Job-related evaluations
frequently during your probationary period)*

EXHIBIT

'RICE-EPS CQMM.
n.

TFI .fiAi eec *«•»-,
TEL.801-965-4937

Sep 06.90

23:33 No.004 P.16

J&&:0 DISPATCHER 8UPPLEKEKTA1 IHPORKXTIOK

*8?e I

• landle constructive critleitn f rea co-workere ana •opervieore who eiay
have aeeertlve personalities.
• The probationary period la utilised
process. An employee nay be rejected
deaonetrated eatlafactory performance
a poor attitude, inceapatibillty or
judge&ent.

a* an extenaion of tba oaloetlen
during probation If they bava not
of the duties or baa denonetrated
inability to do the Job, or poor

• All your calla and radio traneniaelona aro recorded.
• Parfera at a rapid pace, amid estrone confusion, with no ohanea to
organite or prioritize tba work*
- Maintain intense eonoentration and attention for extended periods of
tine.
• Work in a aecured area, where friends or family members »ay Dot be
allowed without prior clearance.
• fubnit to an exteneive,
investigation.

aeneitive,

and confidential

background

WORK SCHEDULE
- »e required to work any of three ahifta or cover ahifta (i.e., day,
awing, graveyard or any variation).
• ae required to work weekenda on a regular basie.
• befinableto ehooae your daya off or your ahifta.
• May bava to work eplit daya off during a work week (i.e., daya off M y
be Tueeday and Friday).
• May have to work any or all bolidaya.
• lave to procure own child care at one hour'a notice for any tine of day
or night.
• Save to eet own child care for weekenda, bolidaya and middle of the
alght en a regular basie.
• lave to arrange for reliable transportation to work on a regular baa is.
- be prepared to work iaueedUtely when your ehift begins. Tardiness la
unacceptable and la cauae for diaciplinary action.
• May bava to cancel daya off or holiday plant on abort notice.

MCE-DPS COMM.

TEL:801-965-4937

W.D10 DISPATCHER SUPPLEMENTAL 2NP0RKATI0U

Sep 06,90

23:34 No.004 P . l ?

Page 3

FUE1TC MUTIONS

• Ant we r telephone calls where someone Xa screening at you and a till be
«bla to use calming techniquea and control tbe conversation.
• Answer telephone calla vhere the caller veea obseene language towards
you ana still be able to raapond to the call appropriately•
• Anawer and raapond appropriately to calls where the caller ia drunk,
irrational* confueed, hysterical, severely wounded or a eosblnstlon of
some of the Above*
• Anawer and raapond to calla vhere a violent crime ia in progress,
(i.e., family fight, aeeault, armed robbery, suicide),
• Answer and respond to calls in which the caller ia alaioat impossible to
understand because of language, equipment, or tbe inability of the
caller to convey a message*
• Save to stake quick tfeelsiens.cn which one or nore person's life and
safety ia at stske while you have limited information or mieinformation
whether intsntional or unintentional.
- Be able to refer an irate caller to the appropriate agency without
offending then*
• Bandle life-threatening, emergency tituatiene en the radio, involving
police offieera while maintaining a calm, profeaaional demeanor.
• Anawer and raapond to calla for ambulanee/paramediee and be able to
help the peraen by giving inatruotiona (i.e., CPU procedure step by
step, mooth-to-»euth rssuseltation procedure, childbirth instruction*)
until the paramedics arrive.
tty aignature affirms that I have read and .constfiered each factor listed*
KAHB^

Snndrfi \)hf\kJ\

CFleaee Print)

tminmt

ADDENDUM D
Exhibit P-5, pp. R.276-7# 279, John Kelly's
proposed three week rotational schedule and
Nancy Hansen's implementation letter dated
February 22, 1990

PRICE DPS COMM.

TEL:801-965-4937

Sep 07»90

22:07 No.002 P.04

MEMORANDUM
TO:
FROM:

rw«

DISPATCH

February 22. 1990

HANCY 1 . HANSEN

SUBJECT: SCHEDULE

As you have heard, Liaa will be returning from maternity leave March 2,
1990 and vill resume her regular ehifti and daye off* In addition,
Sandra plans to work up through March 2.
Where this i% all the day prior to the beginning of the next pey period,
we vill go into a new achedule effective March 3*
Immediately following our crtw meeting lest month John worked up a
achedule which improves the one ve %x% presently using* Be made it
ao there is double coverage every Sunday, thereby allowing that day
to be requested off* Also, a request that it be rotated every 3 weeks
vas approved, as there have been complaints that 2 weeks is too aoon.
John vas also able to work in 3 day long changes when the achedule
rotates.
The actual achedule vill be in the notebook ahortly and a sample copy
is attached. As with the current achedule, this one will rotate down
and works well when it goes into effect, not creating any abort changes,
with the exception of John. Also, day off requesta already in vill
atill be honored.
I appreciate your patience vith the achedule, especially the past lev
veeks where it has changed ao often.
Thanks!

^ a ^ ^

PRICE DPS COMM.

TEL:801-S65-4937
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nfVTSION

BADGE
I

SCHEDULE

DISTRICT

sATimnAT
0700
0900

.1300.
JLMHL

SUNDAY

KOJIDAY

0700

0800

f200
1500

0700
• fftPQ.
1500

2300

2300

FROM
TUESDAY

WEDTK5DAY

0800
0700

0800
0700

THURSDAY

FRIDAY

-07OO
0800

0700.
0900
JiOJL

ISQQ.
-220JL

ISQQ.
.2.300.

LHML

22QSL
JLftKL

1600,

16UQ,

JL2QIL

L50Q.

1700

TO
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I. Has a built in 4 day long change*
2» Would know (/our schedule ron month to «dnth«
3. Position #4| could use a 1dave day & have 3 off.
«. Position 14 could, tensed When, another h
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ADDENDUM E
Exhibit R-l, Rotational Schedule for three
three-week periods, 5-5-90 to 5-25-90, 5-26-90
to 6-15-90, and 6-16-90 to 7-6-90
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ADDENDUM P
Exhibit R-2, Sandra Sheikh resignation letter,
dated 5-10-90
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ADDENDUM G
Exhibit P-l, pp. R.217-18, Record of actual
time worked for 4-28-90 to 5-29-90
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ADDENDUM H
Sandra Sheikh's Charge of Discrimination, dated 8-14-90

I N T E R CHARGE NUMBER

CHARGE OF DISCRIMINATION
T h i i form i t effected by the ^rivocy Act of 1974; t o e Prtvocy A c t Stotemon? on reverse
before completing t h i i form.

CFEPA

90-0467
35C-90-0413

•EEOC

UTAH-DISCRIMINATION DIVISION
and EEOC
(State or local Agency, if any)
(HOME TELEPHONE HO, (include Area C*d>

NAME (Indicate Mr., M*.. or Mrs.)

1801)637-6467

Sandra Sheikh
STREET AOORESS

COUNTY

C I T Y , STATE AND Z I P CODE

1101 So. Carbon Ave.

P r i c e , Utah

84501

NAMED IS T H E EMPLOYER, LABOR ORGANIZATION, EMPLOYMENT AGENCY, APPRENTICESHIP COMMiTTEE%
STATE OR LOCAL GOVERNMENT AGENCY WHO DISCRIMINATED AGAINST ME (// more than one list below.)

Doug Bocero/uirector
S t a t e of Utah/DPS

NAME

NO. OF EMPLOYEES/MEMBERS

(801)637-0893
C I T Y , STATE AND Z I P CODE

STREET AOORESS

84501

Price, Utah

940 South Carbon Avenue

(TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

NAME

C I T Y , STATE AND Z I P CODE

STREET ADDRESS
^L.
CAUSE OF DISCRIMINATION BASED^N (Check appropriate box(es)) C
QRACE

Q*oe

TELEPHONE NUMBER (include Area Cede)

15+

|

| COLOR

G2*

EX

•RELIGION

I

•

iNATIONAi;
* ! & / »

OTHER

($pec»w

THE PARTICULARS ARE (If additional space it needed, attached extra,

sheets)).

•RETALIATION

DATE MOST RECENT OR CONTINUING
DISCRIMINATION TOOK PLACE

Q

fflAlEftJlTy

PERSONAL HARM: As a result of the unfavorable schedule I was afforded following my,
maternity leave, I voluntarily terminated my employment with the State of Utah/DPS afted
10 1/2 years of service.
RESPONDENTS REASON: Hone.
DISCRIMINATION STATEMENT:
I have reason to believe that • I have been illegallj)
discriminated against which I attribute to my sex, female and the fact that I tool!
maternity leave, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended
and. the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act of 1965, as amended, in that: I left my positiori
for'maternity leave effective 3/4/90 at which time I.'made the necessary arrangement witM
my supervisor, N. Hansen to return to my position on the swing shift. I informed Ms J
Hansen I would return to work on 5/5/90. A few days prior to my return datfr, Lis*
Hook/Shift Supervisor called me and scheduled me to return to work on five different
shifts within a one week period. I was unable to comply with this stressful schedule a1
which time I met with my supervisor and attempted to work something out to no avail. '.
made every effort to work with management following my maternity leave however because
of management's refusal to offer only shifts 1 was unable to "work i" was "forced"TS
terminated my employment after ten and one half years of service.

n

1 ol«o wont this chorgo filed* with tho E E O C

I w i l l advise the ogoncios if I change my address or to I o phono
" number and I w i l l cooporoto fully with thorn i n tho processing
of my charge in accord on co with their procaduiw*.

I

I declara vndar penalty of par jury that the foregoing i s true

to and L o c a l Raquiramenti
thcTTh o v t road the above charga and that i t
of my know lodge, information and b e l i e f .

12*0 f C0MPL"AT^

ADDENDUM I
Utah Code Ann. § 3 4 - 3 5 - 6

(1993)

34-35-6

LABOR IN GENERAL

financial support regardless of whether or not the employer was or is
legally obligated to furnish support; or for an employer to give
preference in employment to any person whose education or training
was substantiallyfinancedby the employer for a period of two years
or more.
(b) Nothing contained in this chapter applies to any business or
enterprise on or near an Indian reservation with respect to any publicly
announced employment practice of the business or enterprise under which
preferential treatment is given to any individual because he is a native
American Indian living on or near an Indian reservation.
(c) Nothing contained in this chapter shall be interpreted to require any
employer, employment agency, labor organization, vocational school, joint
labor-management committee, or apprenticeship program subject to this
chapter to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group
because of the race, color, religion, sex, age, national origin, or handicap of
the individual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist with
respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any race, color,
religion, sex, age, national origin, or handicap employed by any employer,
referred or classified for employment by an employment agency or labor
organization, admitted to membership or classified by any labor drgani2ation, or admitted to or employed in, any apprenticeship or other training
program, in comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of
that race, color, religion, sex, age, national origin, or handicap in any
community or county or in the available work force in any community or
county.
(3) It is not a discriminatory or prohibited practice with respect to age to
observe the terms of a bonafideseniority system or any bonafideemployment
benefit plan such as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan which is not a
subterfuge to evade the purposes of this chapter except that no such employee
benefit plan shall excuse the failure to hire any individual.
(4) Notwithstanding Subsection (3), or any other statutory provision to the
contrary, other than Subsection (5) and Section 67-5-8, and except where age
is a bona fide occupational qualification, no person shall be subject to
involuntary termination or retirement from employment on the basis of age
alone, if the individual is 40 years of age or older.
(5) Nothing in this section prohibits compulsory retirement of an employee
who has attained at least 65 years of age, and who, for the two-year period
immediately before retirement, is employed in a bonafideexecutive or a high
policymaking position, if that employee is entitled to an immediate nonforfeitable annual retirement benefit from his employer's pension, profit-sharing,
savings, or deferred compensation plan, or any combination of those plans,
which benefit equals, in the aggregate, at least $44,000.
History: C. 1953, 94*35-6, enacted by L.
1969, ch. S5, f 165; 1971, ch. 78,1 10; 1973,
ch. 65,1 1; 1975, ch. 100,1 1; 1979, ch. 136,
I 8; 1985, ch. 189, I 8; 1985, ch. 803, I 1;
1987, ch. 806, f 4; 1989, ch. 155,1 1.
Cross-References, — Drug and alcohol

testing of prospective employee end employees,
( 34-38-3.
Grievance end appeal procedures, Title 67,
Chapter 19a.
State end state officers and employees governed by this section, f 67*19-4.
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because of race, color, sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related
conditions, religion, national origin, age, if the individual is 40 years
of age or older, or handicap;
(iii) to print, or publish, or cause to be printed or published, any
notice or advertisement relating to employment by the employer, or
membership in or any classification or referral for employment by a
labor organization, or relating to any classification or referral for
employment by an employment agency, indicating any preference,
limitation, specification, or discrimination based on race, color, sex,
pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, religion, national origin, age, if the individual is 40 years of age or older, or
handicap except that a notice or advertisement may indicate a
preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination based on race,
color, religion, sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, age, national origin, or handicap when religion, race, color, sex,
age, national origin, or handicap is a bona fide occupational qualification for employment.
Nothing contained in Subsections (lXa) through (1X0 shall be construed to
prevent the termination of employment of an individual who is physically,
mentally, or emotionally unable to perform the duties required by that
individual's employment, or to preclude the variance of insurance premiums, of
coverage on account of age, or affect any restriction upon the activities of
individuals licensed by the liquor authority with respect to persons under 21
years of age.
(2) (a) It is not a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice:
(i) for an employer to hire and employ employees, for an employment agency to classify or refer for employment any individual, for a
labor organization to classify its membership or to classify or refer for
employment any individual or for an employer, labor organization, or
joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or
other training or retraining programs to admit or employ any individual in any such program, on the basis of religion, sex, pregnancy,
childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, age, national origin, or
handicap in those certain instances where religion, sex, pregnancy,
childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, age, if the individual is 40
years of age or older, national origin, or handicap is a bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise;
(ii) for a school, college, university, or other educational institution
to hire and employ employees of a particular religion if the school,
college, university, or other educational institution is, in whole or in
substantial part, owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a
particular religious corporation, association, or society, or if the
curriculum of the school, college, university, or other educational
institution is directed toward the propagation of a particular religion;
(iii) for an employer to give preference in employment to his own
spouse, son, son-in-law, daughter, daughter-in-law, or to any person
for whom the employer is or would be liable to furnish fym»W»l
support if those persons were unemployed; or for an employer to give
preference in employment to any person to whom the employer during
the preceding six months has furnished more than one-half of total
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34-35-6

LABOR IN GENERAL

(b) for an employment agency:
(i) to refUse to list and properly classify for employment, or to
refuse to refer an individual for employment, in a known available job
for which the individual is otherwise qualified, because of race, color,
sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, religion,
national origin, age, if the individual is 40 years of age or older, or
handicap;
(ii) to comply with a request from an employer for referral of
applicants for employment if the request indicates either directly or
indirectly that the employer discriminates in employment on account
of race, color, sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, religion, national origin, age, if the individual is 40 years of age
or older, or handicap;
(c) for a labor organization to exclude any individual otherwise qualified
from full membership rights in the labor organization, or to expel the
individual from membership in the labor organization, or to otherwise
discriminate against or harass any of its members in full employment of
work opportunity, or representation, because of race, sex, pregnancy,
childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, religion, national origin, age,
if the individual is 40 years of age or older, or handicap;
(d) for any employer, employment agency, or labor organization to print,
or circulate, or cause to be printed or circulated, any statement, advertisement, or publication, or to use any form of application for employment
or membership, or to make any inquiry in connection with prospective
employment or membership, which expresses, either directly or indirectly,
any limitation, specification, or discrimination as to race, color, religion,
sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, national origin, age, if the individual is 40 years of age or older, or handicap or intent
to make any such limitation, specification, or discrimination; unless based
upon a bonafideoccupational qualification, or required by, and given to, an
agency of government for security reasons;
(e) for any person, whether or not an employer, an employment agency,
a labor organization, or the employees or members thereof, to aid, incite,
compel, or coerce the doing of an act defined in this section to be a
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice; or to obstruct or
prevent any personfromcomplying with this chapter, or any order issued
under it; or to attempt, either directly or indirectly, to commit any act
prohibited in this section;
(f) for any employer, labor organization, joint apprenticeship committee, or vocational school, providing, coordinating, or controlling apprenticeship programs, or providing, coordinating, or controlling on-the-jobtraining programs, instruction, training, or retraining programs:
(i) to deny to, or withhold from, any qualified person, because of
race, color, sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, religion, national origin, age, if the individual is 40 years of age
or older, or handicap the right to be admitted to, or participate in any
apprenticeship training program, on-the-job-training program, or
other occupational instruction, training or retraining program;
(ii) to discriminate against or harass any qualified person in that
person's pursuit of such programs, or to discriminate against such a
person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of such programs,
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(b) Any of the following may conduct hearings:
(i) the commission;
(ii) any commissioner;
(iii) the coordinator; or
(iv) a hearing examiner or agent appointed by the commission.
(c) If a witness fails or refuses to obey a subpoena issued by the
commission, the commission may petition the district court to enforce the
subpoena.
(d) (i) No person may be excusedfromattending or testifying* or from
producing records, correspondence, documents, or other evidence in
obedience to a subpoena issued by the commission under the authority of this section on the ground that the evidence or the testimony
required may tend to incriminate him or subject him to any penalty or
forfeiture.
(ii) No person may be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or
forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing
concerning which he shall be compelled to testify or produce evidence
after having claimed his privilege against self-incrimination, except
that a person testifying is not exemptfromprosecution and punishment for peijuiy.
Hiftory: C. 1953, S4-35-5, enacted by L.
Crow-Reference*. —Grievance and appeal
1969, ch. 85,I 164; 1979, cb. 136,1 2; 1979, procedures, Title 67, Chapter 19a.
ch. 139, i 1; 1985, ch. 189, ( 2; 1989, cb. 191,
II.

34-35-6. Discriminatory or unfair employment practices
— Permitted practices.
(1) It is a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice:
(a) (i) for an employer to refuse to hire, or promote, or to discharge,
demote, terminate any person, or to retaliate against, harass, or
discriminate in matters of compensation or in terms, privileges, and
conditions of employment against any person otherwise qualified,
because of race, color, sex, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related
conditions, age, if the individual is 40 years of age or older, religion,
national origin, or handicap. No applicant nor candidate for any job or
position may be considered "otherwise qualified," unless he possesses
the education, training, ability, moral character, integrity, disposition
to work, adherence to reasonable rules and regulations, and other job
related qualifications required by an employer for any particular job,
job classification, or position to befilledor created;
(ii) as used in this chapter, "to discriminate in matters of compensation" means the payment of differing wages or salaries to employees
having substantially equal experience, responsibilities, and skill for
the particular job. However, nothing in this chapter prevents increases in pay as a result of longevity with the employer, if the salary
increases are uniformly applied and available to all employees on a
substantially proportional basis. Nothing in this section prohibits an
employer and employee from agreeing to a rate of pay or work
schedule designed to protect the employeefromloss of Social Security
payment or benefits if the employee is eligible for those payments;
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between supervisor and another, 86 A.LR Fed.
230.
Circumstances which warrant finding of constructive discharge in cases under Age Discrimination in Employment Act (29 USCS
H 621 et seq), 93 A.L.R. Fed. 10.
When does adverse employment decision
based on person's foreign accent constitute na-

tional origin discrimination in violation of Title
VII of Civil Right* Act of 1964 (42 USCS
{§ 2000e et seqj, 104 A.L.R Fed. 816.
Protection of debtor from acts of discrimination by private entity and under | 525(b) of
Bankruptcy Code of 1978 (11 USCS $ 525(b)),
jo5 AL.R Fed. 555.

34-35-7. Repealed.
Repeals, — Section 34-35-7 (L. 1969, ch. 85,
I 166; 1979, ch. 189, ft 2; 1981, ch. 1, ft 1),

relating to violations, eomplsints, and prooedure, was repealed by Lews 1985, ch. 189, ft 5.

34-35-7.1. Procedure for aggrieved person to file claim —
Investigations — Adjudicative proceedings —
Settlement —• Reconsideration — Determination.
(1) (a) Any person claiming to be aggrieved by a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice may by himself, his attorney, or his agent, make,
sign, and file with the commission a request for agency action.
(b) Every request for agency action shall be verified under oath or
affirmation.
(c) A request for agency action made under this section shall be filed
within 180 days after the alleged discriminatory or prohibited employment practice occurred.
(2) Any employer, labor organization, joint apprenticeship committee, or
vocational school who has employees or members who refuse or threaten to
refuse to comply with the provisions of this chapter may file with the
commission a request for agency action asking the commission for assistance
to obtain their compliance by conciliation or other remedial action.
(3) (a) Before a hearing is set or held as part of any adjudicative proceeding,
the commission shall promptly assign an investigator to attempt a
settlement between the parties by conference, conciliation, or persuasion.
(b) If no settlement is reached, the investigator shall make a prompt
impartial investigation of all allegations made in the request for agency
action.
(c) The commission and its staff, agents, and employees shall conduct
every investigation in fairness to all parties and agencies involved, and
may not attempt a settlement between the parties if it is dear that no
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice has occurred.
(d) If the aggrieved party wishes to withdraw the request for agency
action, he must do so prior to the issuance of afinalorder.
(4) (a) If the initial attempts at settlement are unsuccessful, and the
investigator uncovers insufficient evidence during his investigation to
support the allegations of a discriminatory or prohibited employment
practice set out in the request for agency action, the investigator shall
formally report thesefindingsto the director.
(b) Upon receipt of the investigator's report, the director may issue a
determination and order for dismissal of the adjudicative proceeding.
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(c) A party may make a written request to the director for an evidentiary hearing to review de novo the director's determination and order
within 30 days of the date of the determination and order for dismissal.
(d) If the director receives no timely request for a hearing, the determination and order issued by the director becomes the final order of the
commission.
(5) (a) If the initial attempts at settlement are unsuccessful and the
investigator uncovers sufficient evidence during his investigation to support the allegations of a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice
set out in the request for agency action, the investigator shall formally
report thesefindingsto the director.
(b) Upon receipt of the investigator's report the director may issue a
determination and order based on the investigator's report.
(c) A party may file a written request to the director for an evidentiary
hearing to review de novo the director's determination and order within 30
days of the date of the determination and order.
(d) If the director receives no timely request for a hearing, the determination and order issued by the director requiring the respondent to
cease any discriminatory or prohibited employment practice and to
provide relief to the aggrieved party becomes the final order of the
commission.
(6) In any adjudicative proceeding, the investigator who investigated the
matter may not participate in a hearing except as a witness, nor may he
participate in the deliberations of the presiding officer.
(7) Prior to commencement of an evidentiary hearing, the party filing the
request for agency action may reasonably and fairly amend any allegation, and
the respondent may amend its answer.' Those amendments may be made
during or after a hearing but only with permission of the presiding officer.
(8) (a) If, upon all the evidence at a hearing, the presiding officerfindsthat
a respondent has not engaged in a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice, the presiding officer shall issue an order dismissing the
request for agency action containing the allegation of a discriminatory or
prohibited employment practice.
(b) The presiding officer may order that the respondent be reimbursed
by the complaining party for his attorneys' fees and costs.
(9) If upon all the evidence at the hearing, the presiding officerfindsthat a
respondent has engaged in a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice, the presiding officer shall issue an order requiring the respondent to cease
any discriminatory or prohibited employment practice and to provide relief to
the complaining party, including reinstatement, back pay and benefits, and
attorneys' fees and costs.
(10) Conciliation between the parties is to be urged and facilitated at all
stages of the adjudicative process.
(11) (a) Either party may file a written request for review of the order
issued by the presiding officer in accordance with Section 63-46b-12.
(b) If there is no timely request for review the order issued by the
presiding officer becomes the final order of the commission.
. U2) An order of the commission under Subsection (HXa) is subject to
judicial review as provided in Section 63-46b-16.
(13) The commission shall have authority to make rules concerning procedures under this chapter in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah
Administrative Rulemaking Act
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(14) The members of the commission and its staff may not divulge or make
public any information gainedfromany investigation, settlement negotiation,
or proceeding before the commission except in the following:
(a) Information used by the director in making any determination may
be provided to all interested parties for the purpose of preparation for and
participation in proceedings before the commission.
(b) General statistical information may be disclosed provided the identities of the individuals or parties are not disclosed.
(c) Information may be disclosed for inspection by the attorney general
or other legal representatives of the state or commission.
(d) Information may be disclosed for information and reporting requirements of the federal government.
(15) The procedures contained in this section are the exclusive remedy
under state law for employment discrimination based upon race, color, sex,
retaliation, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, age, religion, national origin, or handicap.
(16) The commencement of an action under federal law for relief based upon
any act prohibited by this chapter bars the commencement or continuation of
any adjudicative proceeding before the Utah Antidiscrimination Division in
connection with the same claims under this chapter. Nothing in this subsection
is intended to alter, amend, modify, or impair the exclusive remedy provision
set forth in Subsection (15).
History: C. 1953,8445-7.1, enacted by L.
1985, cb- 189,1 4; 1987, ch. 161,1 105; 1990,
eh. 63, | 2; 1991, eh. 188, t 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 1990, inserted "for
agency action" in Subsection (1Kb) and "for
agency action made under this section" in Subsection (lKc); substituted "request for agency
action" for "written charge" in Subsection (2), "a
hearing is set or held as part of any adjudicative proceeding, the commission shall promptly
assign an investigator" for "an adjudicative
proceeding is set or held, the commission shall
assign an investigator to the charge" in Subsection (SXa), and "all allegations made in the
request for agency action" for 'the allegations
made in the charge" in Subsection (SXb); deleted former Subsection (3Xc), relating to the
disclosure of information or settlement effort*;

redesignated former Sub&rr^cr, (3Xd) as Subsection (3/c). inserted S !>*eci3cn (SXd); and
rewrote the remainder cf dse taction to such an
extent that a detanes crcscanaon would be
impracticable.
The 1991 amendment, effective April 29,
1991, inserted "discriminatory or" near the end
of Subsection (3Xc); added Subsection (4Xd);
substituted all of the present language of Subsection (8Xa) beginning with "request" for "director's determination and ending the adjudicative proceeding"; deleted "If a director's
determination is dismissed" at the beginning of
Subsection (8Kb); added "and costs* at the end
of Subsection (9); substituted "issued by the
presiding officer" for "by the commission" in
Subsection (HXs); rewrote Subsections (12)
and (IS); and made minor changes in punctuation and style throughout the section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Exclusive remedy.
Exhaustion of remedies.
Jury trial.
No independent cause of action found.
Procedure at hearing.
Remedies of commission.
Remedies of district court
Trial de novo.
Exclusive) remedy.
Claims that assert a different injury than

this statute covers, such as intentional tort
claims, and perhaps certain state constitutional claims, are not necessarily foreclosed by
the exclusive remedy provision of Subsection
(11) if an independent cause of action exists
outside this chapter for such claims. Sauers v.
Salt Lake County, 735 F. Supp. 881 CD. Utah
1990).
This chapter preempts common law causes of
action for discharge in retaliation for complaints of employment discrimination. Retherford v. AT & T Communications of the Mt.
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